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LARRY KRAMER
ALAN 0. SYKES
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
UNDER §1983: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Corporations are a legal fiction representing a network of legal,
usually contractual, arrangements. "Corporations" thus do not act,
do not make contracts, sell property, or commit torts; their agents
do. For convenience, we sometimes describe the acts of such agents
as acts of the corporation. But if an agent commits a tort and the
tort is said to have been committed by the corporation (meaning
that damages will be paid out of the corporate treasury), the cor-
poration's liability is necessarily vicarious.
Vicarious liability may be imposed on any number of theories.
At common law, corporate vicarious liability typically rests on the
doctrine of respondeat superior, which holds principals liable for torts
committed by their agents within the scope of employment.1 In
Monell v. Department of Social Services2 the Supreme Court held that
the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to municipal cor-
porations in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. "Instead," the
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Court explained in a much quoted passage, "it is when execution
of a government's policy . . . , whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is re-
sponsible under § 1983 ."3
Like the "scope of employment rule" or the "independent con-
tractor rule" at common-law, the "policy rule" of Monell limits the
circumstances in which a municipal employer may be held liable
for tortious acts committed by agents or employees. Unfortunately,
the Court in Monell did not define the concept of policy: elaboration
of the policy rule was left to future litigation. 4 The result has been
confusion about the limits of municipal liability under § 1983. The
factual patterns in which issues of §1983 municipal liability arise
are extremely diverse, involving everything from employment de-
cisions to licensing decisions to police misconduct. Even a small
sampling of the numerous lower court decisions applying Monell
reveals the absence of any clear understanding of what policy is or
means.- Recent Supreme Court decisions have only added to the
confusion. In each of the last three Terms, the Court agreed to hear
cases for the purpose of elaborating the policy requirement, but
was unable to put together a majority in any. 6
That such uncertainty remains and indeed is growing suggests
that a reexamination of the policy rule is in order. The policy rule
has been extremely difficult to apply coherently, and there is no
reason to continue the exercise. The Monell Court read the language
and legislative history of § 1983 erroneously. Rather than define the
precise limits of liability, Congress intended to create a federal
common-law tort remedy for deprivations under color of state law
of federally protected rights. That conclusion raises the question
how the federal courts should exercise their common-law power in
determining the scope of municipal liability. We contend that this
'1d. at 694.
41d. at 695.
'See, e.g., Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987); Nahmod, Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 ch. 6 (2d ed. 1986).
'The cases are City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985); Pembaur v. City
of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); and City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S.Ct. 1114 (1987).
The Court recently heard argument in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, No. 86-772, which
raises a question suggested by Pembaur: whether a municipality is liable under §1983 for
unconstitutional actions taken by non-policymaking municipal employees acting within the
scope of delegated authority when these actions are not subject to further de novo review.
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question cannot be answered without due regard for the economic
consequences of municipal liability, and that economic analysis may
be dispositive. We conclude that Monell's policy rule-which has
the effect of immunizing the municipality where there is no policy
and making it strictly liable where there is policy-is economically
inefficient. 7 We suggest the adoption of a negligence rule for the
imposition of municipal liability, requiring the plaintiff to show
that the municipality (i.e., municipal officials who supervise the
tortfeasor) failed to take reasonable (i.e., cost-effective) measures to
avert the tort, or, alternatively, the adoption of conventional re-
spondeat superior. With respect to cases in which the individual tort-
feasor enjoys immunity, we tentatively conclude that immunity
ought also to extend to the municipality.
I. A REEXAMINATION OF MuriclPAL LIA LrY UNDER MONELL
A. THE POLICY RULE
The Court's post-Monell efforts have produced two competing
views of what constitutes "policy" for purposes of municipal lia-
bility under § 1983, neither of which has been accepted by a majority
of the justices.
One view, developed in Part IIB of Justice Brennan's opinion in
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnatis (a part joined only by a plurality9),
focuses on the status of the decisionmaker. This view conceptualizes
"policy" as encompassing decisions that are made by persons des-
ignated to speak the last word for the municipality. A second view,
implicit in Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttlelo and elaborated in Justice Powell's dissent in Pembaur,
'This paper uses the term "efficiency" in the Hicks-Kaldor sense: liability rule A is more
efficient that liability rule B if the members of society who prefer A to B can compensate
the members of society who prefer B to A and remain better off themselves, whether or
not such compensation is actually paid. This notion of efficiency underlies applied "cost/
benefit" analysis as it is generally practiced and is the concept of efficiency typically employed
in economic analyses of tort law. See generally Landes & Posner, The Economic Structure
of Tort Law (1987).
8475 U.S. 469 (1986).
9In Pembaur, Justice Brennan delivered an opinion for six justices in Parts I and IIA, for
four justices in Part liB, and for five justices in Part IIC. Justices White, Stevens, and
O'Connor each wrote separate opinions disagreeing with particular aspects of Justice Bren-
nan's analysis. Justice Powell dissented, joined by ChiefJustice Burger andJustice Rehnquist.
1471 U.S. 808 (1985).
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emphasizes the nature of the decision and the process by which it
is made. This view limits "policy" to formal rules, usually of general
applicability, established through careful deliberation.
Pembaur highlights the difference between these views. In that
case, county police officers sought entry to plaintiff's medical clinic
to execute a capias (a form of arrest warrant) for two witnesses
thought to be at the clinic. When plaintiff refused to allow them
to enter, the officers contacted their supervisor, who advised them
to call the prosecutor for instructions. The prosecutor commanded
them to " 'go in and get [the witnesses],' "a command subsequently
held to violate the Fourth Amendment. The liability of the county
turned on whether this order constituted "policy" under Monell.
The evidence showed that county police had never before used
force to gain access to a third-person's property while serving a
capias, that the police handled such matters on a case-by-case basis,
and that the practice of the county police department was to refer
such matters to the county prosecutor and follow his instructions."
Justice Brennan concluded that the prosecutor's order constituted
policy under Monell. He understood the policy rule as intended "to
distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby [to] make clear that municipal liability
is limited to action for which the municipality is actually respon-
sible."' 2 Decisions by some municipal employees are acts "of the
municipality" while other decisions are merely acts "of employees
of the municipality." Liability depends entirely on who makes a
decision: "where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to es-
tablish policy with respect to the action ordered," the decision can
fairly be said to represent a decision of the municipality itself and
the imposition of liability is not vicarious. 3
Justice Powell argued in dissent that the plurality's view consti-
tuted nothing less than a partial overruling of Monell. By focusing
exclusively on the status of the decisionmaker, "local government
11475 U.S. at-., 106 S.Ct. at 1294-96.
'
21d. at.._, 106 S.Ct. at 1298.
"Id. at , 106 S.Ct. at 1298-1300. Justice Brennan did not explain how it is possible
to determine who is a policymaker without first determining what makes something "policy,"
although he did distinguish between policyrmaking power and discretion (apparently in-
cluding discretion to make unreviewed decisions). Id. at__, 106 S.Ct. at 1299-1300. The
Court may clarify the distinction in City of St. Louis v. Prapronick, No. 86-772.
[19V-
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units are now subject to respondeat superior, at least with respect to
a certain class of employees, i.e., those with final authority to make
policy.' 4 Justice Powell argued that the Court should focus on the
characteristics of the decision at issue. Thus, for Justice Powell,
"policy" is established "when a rule is formed that applies to all
similar situations-a 'governing principle [or] plan.' . . . When a
rule of general applicability has been approved, the government
has taken a position for which it can be held responsible."" In rare
instances, a rule not of general applicability may constitute mu-
nicipal policy according to Justice Powell, but only if that rule was
formulated through a properly deliberative process. 16 Because the
prosecutor's order was directed to the specific case only and was
"an off-the-cuff answer to a single question," it did not constitute
policy for purposes of §1983.17
Both the plurality and the dissent in Pembaur read Monell as
holding that municipalities cannot be vicariously liable under §1983,
and both reason that municipal liability is direct rather than vicar-
ious only when a tort is committed pursuant to policy. The argu-
ment in Pembaur thus turns on whether a particular definition of
policy successfully limits municipal liability to situations where the
municipality is directly responsible for the tort or whether it has
the effect of imposing liability vicariously.
Justice Powell is surely correct when he characterizes Justice
Brennan's approach as imposing a form of vicarious liability: the
municipality must pay for the wrongful acts of certain of its em-
ployees. But exactly the same thing can be said of Justice Powell's
approach. The only difference between the two formulations is that
Justice Powell would impose vicarious liability only if the employee
whose acts are to be attributed to the municipality expressed himself
in general terms or chose his course of action carefully.
The problem is that municipal action is always-can only be-
carried out by persons employed by the municipality. Municipal
liability is necessarily vicarious, and there is no such thing as "pol-
icy" that can make a municipality directly rather than vicariously
responsible for a constitutional tort. "Policy" is merely a conclusion
14475 U.S. at__, 106 S.Ct. at 1308.
'5d. at -.. , 106 S.Ct. at 1309.
161d. at -.. , 106 S.Ct. at 1309.
171d. at____, 106 S.Ct. at 1310.
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about which activities by which municipal employees should be
vicariously attributed to the municipality for purposes of § 1983. It
is therefore senseless to try and define policy as the Court has done,
as something that distinguishes acts "of the municipality" from acts
of "employees of the municipality."
But Monell did not hold that all forms of vicarious municipal
liability are improper. Monell held only that "a municipality cannot
be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor--or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a res-
pondeat superior theory."' 8 Thus, the proper question is not whether
we can define policy in such a way as to prevent imposing vicarious
liability, but whether we can define policy in such a way as to
prevent imposing a particular form of vicarious liability-respondeat
superior.
This refinement does little to solve the problem of defining "pol-
icy." There are several semantically plausible definitions of policy. ,9
The problem is to choose which of these definitions best serves the
purpose underlying the "policy" concept as it is used in the context
of § 1983 municipal liability. But Monell tells us only that municipal
liability must rest on more than respondeat superior, and all of the
competing definitions of policy satisfy this requirement. For ex-
ample, Justice Brennan's approach in Pembaur is more than respondeat
superior, because the municipality is not liable for acts by every
municipal employee; it is respondeat superior "plus," with the plus
factor being the limitation to those employees who make policy.
Similarly, Justice Powell's approach limits the scope of respondeat
superior to a particular kind of act by policymaking employees.
Indeed, every definition of policy that in any way limits the or-
dinary scope of respondeat superior will satisfy Monell by not imposing
liability "solely because [the municipality] employs a tortfeasor." 0
It is, therefore, not surprising that courts have had difficulty im-
plementing Monells policy rule. By limiting municipal liability to
acts pursuant to "policy" without saying anything more than policy
is something different from respondeat superior, the Supreme Court
18436 U.S. at 691; see also id. at 692 & n.57.
19Consider, for example, the different dictionary definitions cited and relied upon by the
Justices. Compare Pembaur, 475 U.S. at __, 106 S.Ct. at 1299, n.9 (opinion of Brennan,
J.) with id. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 1309 (Powell, J., dissenting) and City of Oklahoma City
v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 n.6.
20436 U.S. at 691.
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established a vague category susceptible to many plausible defini-
tions.
Should the policy rule therefore be abandoned? The Court in
Monell deliberately chose not to elaborate the meaning of policy,
and it may be that the reasoning which led the Court to reject
respondeat superior suggests ways of refining the policy rule. Reex-
amining Monell, however, demonstrates only that the Court's rea-
sons for rejecting the use of respondeat superior under §1983 were
mistaken.
B. MONELL
Monell offered two propositions to support its conclusion that
Congress did not intend municipalities to be liable under §1983
unless a tort resulted from action pursuant to municipal policy.
First, the Court suggested that this limitation was implicit in the
language of §1983. Second, it contended that the application of
respondeat superior to municipalities would be inconsistent with § 198 3's
legislative history.
1. Monell's Analysis of the language of §1983. Section 1983 holds
liable "[e]very person who, under color of [state law] subjects, or
causes to be subjected" any person to the deprivation of a federally
protected right.2 1 Monell overruled the holding of Monroe v. Pape
that municipal corporations are not "persons" within the meaning
of this language.22 At the same time, the Court found significance
in the phrase "subjects or causes to be subjected." According to the
Court, "that language cannot be easily read to impose liability vi-
cariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence
of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor. Indeed, the
fact that Congress did specifically provide that A's tort became B's
liability if B 'caused' A to subject another to a tort suggests that
Congress did not intend §1983 liability to attach where such cau-
sation was absent."2 3
21n its entirety, § 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress." 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982).
22See Monell, 436 U.S. at 664-89; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961).
23436 U.S. at 692.
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The Court does not explain why the municipality "causes" the
constitutional tort only if the tort is committed pursuant to official
policy. The practical effect of the policy rule is to limit vicarious
liability to cases in which high-level municipal employees partici-
pate in the tort. But even if there is reason to treat the acts of high-
level employees differently from the acts of lower-level employees,
that reason has nothing to do with causation and thus nothing to
do with the language upon which the Court focused. The munic-
ipality has not "caused" the tort more in one situation than in the
other.
More importantly, the Court was wrong to suppose that the
language of § 1983 conveys such subtle limitations on liability. That
language, which was proposed and debated as § I of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, was borrowed from §2 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.24 The wording was given little thought or attention by its
drafters, who were primarily concerned with the more controversial
provisions of sections two through four.25 For similar reasons, § 1
was largely ignored during the bitter and extensive floor debate
concerning the 1871 Civil Rights Act. 26 Supporters said only that
§ 1 was to be "liberally and beneficently construed" by the courts. 27
The only opponent of the Act to address § 1 in any detail was
Senator Thurman, and his chief complaint was that its language
was vague and raised more questions than it answered. 28
The reason so little attention was paid to the wording of § I is
suggested by a colloquy between Senators Thurman and Edmunds
about another provision of the Act at a later point in the debate:
Edmunds (who sponsored the 1871 Act) responded to Thurman's
charge that the Act omitted certain essential safeguards by stating
that these need not be included by Congress since they were already
24Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162-63 (1970); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. app. at 68 (1871) [hereinafter Globe] (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); Nahmod,
note 7 supra, at §1.03.
2 For the history of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1, see Fairman, VII History of the Supreme
Court of the United States ch. 3 (1987); Comment, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 402, 407-17 (1979);
see generally Globe, note 24 supra.
26See Globe, note 24 supra, passim; Monell, 436 U.S. at 665.
"Globe, note 24 supra, app. at 68 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); see also id. at 800
(statement of Rep. Perry). Similar statements are collected and cited in Monell, 436 U.S. at
684-85 & n.45.
28Globe, note 24 supra, app. at 216-17.
11987
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provided by the common law.29 In other words, the language of
§ 1983 was not intended to define fully the extent of liability, which
would be determined by the courts through common-law adjudi-
cation. 30
2. Monell's analysis of §1983's legislative history. The holding in
Monell does not rest solely on the Court's textual argument. Indeed,
the Court relied "[p]rimarily"' on a second proposition: that the
limitation of municipal liability to action pursuant to official policy
is mandated by the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, in particular, the debate over the so-called "Sherman amend-
ment."
The history of the Sherman amendment, which was twice mod-
ified by conference committees before being passed, is recounted
in great detail in Monell.12 The relevant portion of that history is
the House debate in which the first conference report was rejected."
29See Globe, note 24supra, at 771. Senator Thurman responded that common-law doctrines
should not be read into a statute. Ibid. See also the colloquy between Senators Sherman,
Edmunds, Thurman, and Frelinghuysen in which Senator Sherman explains that an amend-
ment to his proposed amendment is unnecessary because the common-law already contains
such a provision. Id. at 707.
"In addressing other questions under §1983, the Court has recognized that the statute
should be "read against the background of tort liability." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
187 (1961). Accord Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 n.13 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409,418 (1976). See also Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability,
50 Ind. L. J. 5 (1974); Comment, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935, 939 (1979); Comment, 37 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 494, 507-08 (1970).
"'See Pembaur, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298 (1986).
"See Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-83.
"Globe, note 24supra, at 755; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 703-b4. The bill which became
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was proposed as H.R. 320 by Representative Shellabarger on
March 28, 1871. Globe, note 24 supra, at 317. Senator Sherman introduced his amendment
immediately prior to the vote in the Senate. Id. at 663, 686. As proposed, the Sherman
amendment would have added a provision to the Act making any inhabitant of a municipality
liable for damage inflicted within municipal boundaries by any persons "riotously and
tumultuously assembled" for the purpose of depriving the victim of federally protected
rights. Id. at 663. Under the Senate's rules, no discussion of the amendment was allowed
and it passed without debate. Id. at 704-09.
The House refused-also without debate-to acquiesce in the Sherman amendment by
a vote of 45-132 and requested a conference on this and several other amendments made
by the Senate to H.R. 320. Id. at 725. Despite the overwhelming rejection of the Sherman
amendment by the House, the Senate voted not to recede and agreed to confer. Id. at 727-
28. The conferees submitted an alternative version of the Sherman amendment to the Senate
the very next day. The debate over this proposal, which modified the original proposal to
give the victim an action against the municipality itself, was thus the first open debate in
Congress on the merits of the Sherman amendment.
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This report proposed adding to the 1871 Act a section that would
provide victims of injuries inflicted by "any persons riotously and
tumultuously assembled together" an action for damages against
the municipality in which the injuries were inflicted. The munic-
ipality, in turn, was given an action for indemnity against the
wrongdoers.
As explained in Monell, the Representatives who voted against
this proposal-in particular, the moderate Republicans who held
the balance of power in the House' 4-- did so because they thought
that it was unconstitutional." Congress sought in the 1871 Act to
stop groups such as the Ku Klux Klan from using violence to prevent
individuals from exercising their constitutional rights. The Sher-
man amendment went beyond the Act's provisions for federal in-
tervention and sought by imposing liability to compel municipalities
to assist the federal government in this effort. Opponents of the
Sherman amendment contended that, while Congress could create
federal mechanisms for enforcing constitutional rights, it could not
obligate state and local governments to allocate their resources to
the task. 36
This understanding of the limits of federal power was consistent
with then-existing Supreme Court precedents such as Collector v.
Day17 and Prigg v. Pennsylvania." In fact, the moderate Republicans
The Senate agreed to the conference report by a vote of 32-16, essentially identical to
the 38-24 vote that had approved Senator Sherman's initial proposal. Id. at 707, 779. The
House again voted the amendment down, this time by the somewhat closer margin of 74-
106. Id. at 800. A second conference was held and the amendment was drastically altered:
the second conference version did not mention municipalities; it imposed liability on indi-
viduals who knew that a wrong was to be committed and had power to prevent it but failed
to act. Id. at 801, 802, 819-20. This version easily passed both Houses of Congress. Id. at
804, 808, 831. It is currently codified as 42 U.S.C. §1986.
14See Comment, note 24 supra, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 414-20.
"Monell, 436 U.S. at 669-83.
16Globe, note 24 supra, at 795 (statement of Rep. Blair). This position was espoused by
all of the Republicans who spoke against the Sherman amendment. See id. at 791 (statement
of Rep. Willard); id. at 793 (statement of Rep. Poland); id. at 795 (statement of Rep. Burchard);
id. at 799 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth).
"Collector held that the federal government could not tax a state court judge because this
would enable the federal government to cripple or destroy the "means and instrumentalities
employed [by the states] for carrying on the operations of their governments." 11 Wall. 113,
125-126 (1871).
3"Prigg held that, while the Fugitive Slave Clause empowered Congress to enact legislation
for the return of escaped slaves, Congress could not require state officers to execute such
legislation but must provide federal means of doing so. 16 Pet. 539, 615-16 (1842).
['1987
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whose votes defeated the first conference report cited and discussed
these cases as the source of their opposition.
Although the Sherman amendment had nothing to do with § 1
of the 1871 Act, Justice Brennan found the reasons for its rejection
pertinent to the imposition of municipal liability under § 1983. He
argued that respondeat superior imposes an obligation on employers
to prevent their employees from committing torts that is much like
the obligation to prevent Klan violence imposed on municipalities
by the Sherman amendment.40 It follows, therefore, that "creation
of a federal law of respondeat superior would have raised all the con-
stitutional problems associated with the obligation to keep the peace,
an obligation Congress chose not to impose because it thought
imposition of such an obligation unconstitutional. '41
This reasoning proves too much. Justice Brennan asserts that
respondeat superior under § 1983 would have raised the same consti-
tutional objections as the Sherman amendment because it too im-
poses an obligation on municipalities. But if all such obligations
suffer the same constitutional infirmity, why was it not also un-
constitutional for Congress to impose an obligation to obey the
Constitution on individual state officers? The only difference be-
tween requiring an individual officer not to violate the Constitution
and requiring a municipality to insure that its employees do not
violate the Constitution is that the individual officer is made re-
sponsible only for his own behavior, while the municipality is made
responsible for the behavior of agents. But that distinction has
39See, e.g., Globe, note 24 supra, at 795 (discussing Prigg and Collector v. Day) (statement
of Rep. Blair); id. at 793 (discussing Collecter v. Day) (statement of Rep. Poland); id. at 799
(discussing Collecter v. Day) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth).
40436 U.S. at 693-94.
4"d. In a footnote, Justice Brennan added that the Sherman amendment was the only
form of vicarious liability presented to Congress and concluded that "combined with the
absence of any language in §1983 which can easily be construed to create respondeat superior
liability, the inference that Congress did not intend to impose such liability is quite strong"
436 U.S. at 693 n.57. On the contrary, any such inference depends on erroneous assumptions.
The nature of the liability to be imposed by the Sherman amendment was significantly
different from respondeat superior, and its rejection cannot reasonably be interpreted to say
anything at all about the question. The Sherman amendment would have made the munic-
ipality liable for unlawful acts committed by anyone-citizens, employees, or strangers-
within municipal boundaries. Although a few states and England may have had similar "riot
acts," see Globe, note 24supra, at 760-61 (statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at 792 (statement
of Rep. Butler), this was an unusually severe form of vicarious liability. Respondeat superior,
on the other hand, was an already long-established and unexceptionable common-law rule.
See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 835-39 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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nothing to do with the constitutional principles that made the Sher-
man amendment objectionable. Indeed, the cases relied upon by
the opponents of the Sherman amendment-Collector v. Day and
Prigg v. Pennsylvania-involved federal efforts to impose duties on
individual state officials. The Sherman amendment's opponents
were able to make their argument only by claiming that munici-
palities were identical to individual officers as regards the principle
of dual sovereignty recognized in these cases. 42
Thus, if Justice Brennan is right-if Congress would have found
the imposition of a duty on municipalities to prevent their em-
ployees from violating the Constitution subject to the same objec-
tions as the Sherman amendment-then Congress would have also
opposed the imposition of an obligation to obey the Constitution
on individual state officials. Yet everyone agreed that §1983 was
intended to do just that. 4 1 The moderate Republicans whose votes
defeated the Sherman amendment voted in favor of § 1983."
These votes can, however, be reconciled. The opponents of the
Sherman amendment distinguished between imposing an entirely
new obligation on a state officer, and requiring a state officer to
discharge obligations already imposed by state law in accordance
with the Constitution. The federal government could not add to
the duties imposed on state agents by state law an additional duty
to prevent Klan violence, but the federal government could require
state agents to discharge duties the state had already placed on them
in accordance with the Constitution.45 In other words, the argument
that the federal government had no power to impose obligations on
state agents did not include the obligation to obey the Constitution
in the pursuit of ends established by state law.
4'See, e.g., Globe, note 24 supra, at 795 (statement of Rep. Blair): "It was held also in the
case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania (I speak from recollection only) that it was not within the
power of the Congress of the United States to lay duties upon a State officer; that we cannot
command a state officer to do any duty whatever, as such; and I ask gentlemen to show me
the difference between that and commanding a municipality, which is equally the creature
of the State, to perform a duty."
43Monell, 436 U.S. at 682-83; see, e.g., Globe, note 24 supra, at 334 (statement of Rep.
Hoar); id. at 365 (statement of Rep. Arthur); id. at 367-68 (statement of Rep. Sheldon); id.
at 385 (statement of Rep. Lewis).
44Compare Globe, note 24 supra, at 522 with id. at 800.
4SThis distinction was drawn by a number of opponents to the Sherman amendment. See,
e.g., Globe, note 24 supra, at 794 (statement of Rep. Poland); id. at 795 (statement of Rep.
Blair); id. (statement of Rep. Burchard); id. at 799 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth). Cf. Levin,
The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 Georgetown L. J. 1483, 1520-31 (1977).
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This distinction may sound hollow to the modern ear. After all,
requiring a state officer not to violate the Constitution while per-
forming duties imposed by state law is still imposing an obligation-
the obligation to obey the United States Constitution. In both cases,
a state officer is being required by the federal government to act in
a particular way. The distinction may be justified, however, by the
difference in degree of intrusion by the federal government into
the operation of state government. In any event, and however weak
or strong the distinction may appear today, it was recognized and
accepted by the members of the Forty-Second Congress.
What this means, moreover, is that the constitutional objections
to the Sherman amendment have no bearing on whether a munic-
ipality may be liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.
Under Collecter v. Day and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, it was thought that
Congress could not impose obligations on individual state officers.
But there was no constitutional impediment to holding such officers
liable if they violated the Constitution while performing tasks del-
egated to them by the state. For purposes of Collector v. Day and
Prigg, there was no distinction between individual and corporate
agents of the state.46 Thus, by analogy to these same cases, Congress
could not impose affirmative obligations on municipalities. How-
ever, still reasoning by analogy, there would have been no consti-
tutional impediment to holding municipalities liable for constitu-
tional violations committed by municipal employees performing
tasks delegated to the municipality by the state.
II. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN INTERPRETING § 1983: TOWARD A
COMMON-LAw FOUNDATION FOR MUNICIPAL LIABILUTY
What follows from the conclusion that Monell's analysis is
unsound? Does the inadequacy of its reasoning imply that respondeat
46This was Representative Blair's argument cited supra at note 42. This conclusion is also
consistent with the prevailing legal theory, which held that a municipal corporation is merely
an agent of the state to which some of the duties of governing have been assigned. See, e.g.,
Shearman & Redfield, The Law of Negligence §§116-22 (2d ed. 1870); Dillon, The Law
of Municipal Corporations §§29-39 (1872); Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 211 (1868);
Cooley, General Principles of Constitutional Law 344-45 (1880).
Interestingly, Justice Brennan relied on the identity between individual and corporate
agents in Part I of Mondl to explain why the objections to the Sherman amendment did not
support the conclusion that municipalities could never be liable under § 1983. See 436 U.S.
at 682; Mead, 42 U.S.C. §1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted
Picture, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 517, 535-36 (1987).
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superior should be fully applicable to municipalities? Other com-
mentators and one Justice have reached this conclusion, arguing
that if the language and legislative history of § 1983 do not preclude
municipal liability on a respondeat superior theory, then the fair as-
sumption is that it was intended to apply to suits under §1983. 4 7
These commentators note that the doctrine of respondeat superior was
used against municipalities in 1871 and argue that the members of
the Forty-Second Congress were familiar with common-law prin-
ciples and presumably intended them to apply.
This is a conventional method of statutory construction. Courts
often assume that if the language and legislative history of a statute
are silent on a question, the legislature intended to incorporate then-
prevailing rules of law. Hence, it is certainly plausible to interpret
§1983 to incorporate nineteenth-century principles of respondeat
superior.
The argument is plausible, but incomplete. To be sure, municipal
corporations sometimes incurred liability under respondeat superior
at the time § 1983 was enacted. 4 8 But more commonly, municipal
corporations were insulated from liability by various immunity
doctrines not applicable to private corporations. For example, mu-
nicipal corporations were not liable for wrongs committed by mu-
nicipal employees performing "governmental" rather than "corpo-
rate" (we would now say "proprietary") activities.49 This limitation
on municipal liability is significant here because, while the classi-
fication of municipal activities as "corporate" or "governmental"
was often controversial,5 0 the vast majority of § 1983 claims probably
41See, e.g., Pembaur, 475 U.S. at -. , 106 S.Ct. at 1303 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Mead, note 46 supra, at 538-42; Blum, From Monroe to
Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 Temp. L. Q. 409,
413 n. 15 (1978); Comment, 47 Brook. L. Rev. 517, 552-57 (1981); Comment, note 30supra,
46 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 952-55; Comment, 64 Iowa L. Rev. 1032, 1045-52 (1979); Note, 7
Hofstra L. Rev. 893, 917-21 (1979).
48See Cooley, The Law or Torts 619-27 (1879) (citing cases); Dillon, note 46 supra, at
§§752-802 (citing cases); Shearman & Redfield, note 46 supra, ch. 8 (citing cases). See also
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at -, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1303 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 834-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mead, note 46 supra,
at 527; Blum, note 47 supra; Comment, note 30 supra, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 956-61.
49See Dillon, note 46 supra, at §§753-55, 764, 778-80; Cooley, note 48 supra, at 619-20;
Shapo, Municipal Liability for Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand of American Legal
History, 17 U. Miami L. Rev. 475, 478-79 (1963); Note, 30 Am. St. Rep. 376 (1892) (citing
cases); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 644-47 (1980).
"°See Dillon, note 46 supra, §766 at 724.
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involve municipal functions that were traditionally classified as
governmental .51
The "governmental functions" immunity apparently was not
available if the wrongful act "was expressly authorized by the gov-
erning body of the corporation, or where, without such special
authorization, it ... has been ratified by the corporation. '52 This
is rather similar to the policy rule of Monell. Consequently, and
somewhat ironically, proponents of the view that § 1983 should be
interpreted consistently with common-law principles in use when
it was enacted may find themselves reaffirming the policy rule after
all. In any event, advocates of this interpretation of §1983 must
explain why municipalities can no longer rely on the common-law
immunities."s
Simply posing this question suggests another: why should lia-
bility under §1983 depend upon-or have anything to do with-
the common law of 1871? Why, in other words, should congres-
sional silence on the issue of municipal liability be interpreted to
incorporate and freeze then-existing common-law rules?54
"Levin, note 45 supra, at 1521 n.156.
31Dillon, note 46 supra, §770 at 728 & n.2 (citing cases). See also Cooley, note 48 supra,
at 621; Shearman & Redfield, note 46 supra, §120 at 148. Shearman and Redfield went
farther than this and asserted in 1869 that the distinction between governmental and corporate
activities had been "entirely repudiated:' Ibid. However, they did not support this assertion
with any authority, and, in light of the cases cited by Dillon, Cooley, and others, it appears
that Shearman and Redfield were trying to shape rather than describe law. Although in-
accurate at the time, Shearman's and Redfield's assertion subsequently became the law in
most-states. See note 54 infra.
"In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Supreme Court held that
the common-law "governmental functions" immunity is not available to municipalities sued
under §1983. Tracing the source of this doctrine to the principle of sovereign immunity,
the Court explained: "the municipality's 'governmental' immunity is obviously abrogated
by the sovereign's enactment of a statute making it amenable to suit. Section 1983 was just
such a statute. By including municipalities within the class of 'persons' subject to liability
for violations of the Federal Constitution and laws, Congress-the supreme sovereign on
matters of federal law-abolished whatever vestiges of the State's sovereign immunity the
municipality possessed." Id. at 647-48 (footnote omitted). This is ipse dixit. The fact that
Congress could have abrogated this municipal immunity does not mean that it did so. In
precisely the same way, Congress could have abrogated the traditional common-law im-
munities of individual officials. Yet the Supreme Court has held that Congress did not abolish
these immunities in enacting 1983. See notes 64-68, 76-86 infra and accompanying text.
54The rules of municipal liability in the states have undergone profound changes in the
last 117 years as a product of both judicial and legislative efforts. See Prosser & Keeton,
note 1 supra, at 1051-52; Shapo, note 49 supra. See also Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. at 680-82 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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The language and legislative history of § 1983 say nothing about
a great many issues in addition to municipal liability that arise under
the statute. To name only a few, the statute and its legislative history
do not indicate what defenses are available,"5 who bears the burdens
of pleading and persuasion,5 6 what kinds of damages are recover-
able,57 or whether exhaustion of state remedies is required.-8 Surely
Congress must have been aware that cases under § 1983 would raise
many issues not answered by the text. The legislative history sug-
gests an explanation for Congress' silence on these issues. Sup-
porters of the 1871 Act wanted a federal remedy for injuries as-
sociated with the denial under color of state law of federally protected
rights. Once the existence of a remedy was established, however,
the Act's supporters were content to allow the courts to develop
its boundaries as part of the federal common law of torts. Thus,
on the few occasions when opponents pointed to the omission of
particular details from the Act, supporters answered that such pro-
visions were "not necessary because the common law gives a
remedy. '5 9
One can, of course, read these references to the common law as
evidence that Congress thought it was incorporating then-existing
common law into the statute. Far more likely, however, is the con-
clusion that Congress intended the federal courts to shape and
develop this tort as part of the general common law. It was the
heyday of Swift v. Tyson;60 the existence of an evolving common
law and of federal judicial power to share in its development was
a given. Indeed, some members of Congress apparently understood
§1983 as nothing more than a grant of federal jurisdiction over
common-law tort actions that had previously been heard exclusively
"See, e.g., Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554-55 (1967).
s6See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
"See, e.g., Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 106 S.Ct. 2537 (1986);
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247
(1981); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
"See, e.g., Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
"See Globe, note 24 supra, at 707 (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also id. at 771 (statement
of Sen. Edmunds); notes 24-30 supra and accompanying text.
6016 Pet. 1 (1842).
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by state courts. 6' Thus, while the issue is not free from doubt, the
sounder view is that-as with the Sherman Act and the federal
habeas corpus statute--Congress intended not only to allow the
common law to inform § 1983, but also to permit the common-law
interpretation of the statute to evolve with the rest of the common
law.
The Supreme Court has sometimes said that it does not have
common-lawmaking powers under § 198 3.62 Where the language and
legislative history do not make congressional intent clear, the Court
has said, § 1983 should be interpreted by assuming that the "mem-
bers of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles
• . .and that they likely intended these common-law principles to
obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.' ' 63 Notwithstand-
ing such statements, the Court has seldom hesitated to abandon
historical inquiry into congressional intent in favor of its own anal-
ysis of sound public policy.
Consider the cases on official immunity.64 The language and leg-
islative history of § 1983 do not indicate whether state officials may
assert immunities, and the Court has engaged in an official-by-
official analysis of whether immunity is available. In its early en-
counters with this question, the Court simply asked whether there
was an analogous tort immunity at common-law and assumed that
if Congress had wished to abrogate that immunity it would have
said So. 65 But the Court did not adhere to this approach in subse-
diSenator Thurman began his remarks in opposition with the statement that §1 of the
1871 Civil Rights Act "creates no new cause of action. Its whole effect is to give to the
Federal Judiciary that which now does not belong to it-a jurisdiction that may be consti-
tutionally conferred upon it, I grant, but that has never yet been conferred upon it." Globe,
note 24 supra, app. at 216. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 502, n.30 (1978),
quoting District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1973).
2See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, -, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1097 (1986); see also
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316 (1975).
63City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981). See also, e.g., Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, -, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1097 (1986); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S.
325, 330, 334 (1983); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) ("Congress would have
specifically so provided had it wished to abolish" common-law doctrines).
6The pattern described here is not limited to the issue of official immunity but can be
found in the Court's solution to other questions not resolved by the language or legislative
history of § 1983. See Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light
on Section 1988, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 601, 611 (1985). See, e.g., cases cited at notes 55-58
supra.
6sSee, e.g., Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554-55 (1967).
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quent cases. In some cases, the Court ignored or disregarded the
common law and resolved the question of immunity solely on the
basis of policy considerations such as whether liability would have
an undue chilling effect on decisionmaking. 6 In other cases, the
Court examined the common law to see whether it provided im-
munity, and asked whether the considerations supporting the
common-law rule likewise warrant immunity under § 1983 .67 In still
other cases, the Court discussed both common-law and public pol-
icy considerations, without explaining how these considerations are
related. 68 In none of these subsequent cases did the Court limit its
examination of the common law to the period before 1871.
The inconsistency between these cases and statements that § 1983
should be presumed to incorporate common-law doctrines well-
established in 1871 is striking. Whatever it may say, the Court does
not adhere to the common-law as it stood in 1871. Nonetheless,
the Court continues to deny that it can make-and has been making--
federal common-law pursuant to §1983. This reticence is unnec-
essary. Congress left all but the most basic questions of liability
unresolved when it enacted § 1983. It anticipated that the common
law would fill the gaps and in no way suggested that the Courts
should not depart from the common-law as it existed in 1871 .69
"See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982).
67See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1976).
"See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318-22 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242-
49 (1974). In Malley and Tower, the Court did explain that the " 'initial inquiry is whether
an official claiming immunity under §1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the
privilege he asserts,' "and that if such a privilege is found to exist, " 'the Court next considers
whether § 1983's history or purposes nonetheless counsel against recognizing the same im-
munity in §1983 actions.' " Malley, 106 S.Ct. at 1095 (quoting Tower, 467 U.S. at 920).
Although this tells us the order in which to ask questions about history and policy, it does
not explain what in "§ 1983's history or purposes" will trump the common-law or why. Nor
does this description explain the cases in which history but not policy or policy but not
history was relied upon.
69Cf. Kreimer, note 64 sapra, at 630. In Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), the Court
held that a plaintiff could recover punitive damages against state officials who acted with
reckless indifference to plaintiff's federal rights. Both Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
and Justice Rehnquist's dissent included extensive discussion of nineteenth-century common-
law authorities. Ina separate dissent, Justice O'Connor came close to advocating this approach
to interpreting § 1983. She agreed that it made sense to look to the common-law as it existed
in 1871 "when there was a generally prevailing rule of common law, for then it is reasonable
to assume that Congressmen were familiar with that rule and imagined that it would cover
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III. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The conclusion that Monell is unsound and that the rules of
municipal liability should be developed as part of the federal com-
mon law obviously does not establish who should incur liability
when a municipal employee commits a tort. Should liability be
imposed on the employee, the municipality, or both? We now turn
to familiar tools of economic analysis to explore this problem.70
Put simply, economic analysis asks how to design a liability rule
that will maximize the net economic value of municipal activity-
the excess of its economic benefits over its economic costs. This
inquiry, in turn, requires attention to three components of economic
value. The first component is the efficiency of the precautions or
deterrent measures that result under alternative liability rules. This
is really a rather simple notion: liability rules create incentives to
take precautions against accidental injuries and stand as a deterrent
to intentional harms. These precautions and deterrent measures
produce benefits in the form of a reduction in the number and
magnitude of injuries, but they also impose costs on the individuals
and institutions subject to liability. Economic analysis undertakes
to identify the net gain from precautions or deterrent measures
under alternative liability rules and, other things being equal, pre-
fers the rule for which the excess of benefits over costs is at a
maximum.
the cause of action they were creating." But, she continued, "when a significant split in
authority existed, it strains credulity to argue that Congress simply assumed that one view
rather than the other would govern. . . . Once it is established that the common law of 1871
provides us with no real guidance on this question, we should turn to the policies underlying
§1983 to determine which rule best accords with those policies." Id. at 93.
70A number of recent papers analyze rules of vicarious liability from the economic per-
spective, but do not directly address the liability of municipalities. See Kraakman, Corporate
Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L. J. 857 (1984); Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. Econ. & Org.
53 (1986); Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J.
Legal Stud. 517 (1980); Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L. J. 1231
(1984) [hereinafter The Economics of Vicarious Liability]; Sykes, The Boundaries of Vi-
carious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related
Doctrines, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1988) [hereinafter The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability].
Some of the principles developed in this literature apply directly to the public sector, but
others do not-as discussed below, the imposition of vicarious liability on governmental
entities raises several difficult issues that do not arise in the private sector. Economic issues
relating to municipal liability are addressed briefly in Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis
of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 Calif. L. Rev.
1345 (1982).
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A second component of economic value is the effect of alternative
liability rules on scale of activity. Actors in the marketplace-in-
dividual or corporate, public or private-are limited in their ability
to carry on activities by the resources available to them. Damages
payments consume resources and thus tend to affect the scale of
activity of those who are liable for damages (as well as those to
whom they are paid). Other things being equal, economic analysis
will prefer the liability rule that adjusts everyone's scale of activity
so that the marginal benefit of an increase in scale is equal to its
marginal cost-if such a rule exists.
The third component of value is the effect of different liability
rules on the efficiency of risk bearing. Some individuals or orga-
nizations are better able to bear risk than others because, for ex-
ample, they can better diversify the risk or can more easily lay it
off on a superior risk bearer (such as an insurance company). Other
things being equal, economic analysis will prefer the liability rule
that allocates risk to institutions that are close to risk neutral and
that shifts risk away from risk-averse individuals.
The importance of these considerations to the choice of liability
rules seems self-evident. 7' The real question is whether the eco-
nomic analysis is dispositive, or whether other, non-economic con-
siderations also require attention. For example, economic analysis
makes no allowance for purely distributional objectives like the
provision of compensation to injured persons without regard to the
effect of compensation on prevention, scale of activity, and risk
bearing. Arguably, the pursuit of compensation for its own sake
should not play an important role in the common-law jurisprudence
of § 1983. The legislative history of § 1983 makes abundantly clear
that Congress enacted § 1983 to deter state officials from depriving
state residents, particularly the newly freed slaves and Southern
Republicans, of federally protected rights; there was no talk of
enacting this statute to provide needed compensation to victims of
constitutional torts. 72
71The congruence between the economic theory of liability and the common law of torts
has been well documented, see, e.g., Landes & Posner, note 7 supra; Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law (3d ed. 1986), including the considerable congruence between economic
efficiency and the common law of vicarious liability, Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious
Liability, note 70 supra.
"See Globe, note 24 supra, passim; see also Developments in the Law, Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1142-52 (1977).
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Nonetheless, some readers may find our analysis incomplete as
a normative basis for policymaking due to the omission of express
attention to "compensation" or some other conceivable policy ob-
jective. In any event, the issues that we address are by all accounts
central to-if perhaps not exhaustive of-the policy debate. 73
IV. RuLEs OF OnnciAL Im UrTY
The vicarious liability of employers in the private sector is
almost always joint and several with their employees. With very
few exceptions, plaintiffs cannot reach the employer of the tort-
feasor unless they can also establish the tortfeasor's individual lia-
bility. Of course, the individual liability of the injurer is not suf-
ficient to allow the plaintiff to reach the injurer's employer-rules
like the scope-of-employment rule and the independent contractor
rule act as limitations on the scope of the employer's vicarious
liability. Thus, depending upon the circumstances in which an
employee commits a tort, the employee may be liable alone or the
employer may be jointly and severally liable with the employee,
but liability on the employer alone is extremely uncommon.
The existing rules of liability that apply to municipalities and to
their employees under § 1983 are often parallel. A plaintiff may seek
damages from an employee who committed the tort. But, as in the
private sector, the liability of the employee may not be sufficient
for municipal liability since the plaintiff cannot recover from the
municipality without also satisfying the policy rule of Monell. In
these cases, the policy rule functions like the familiar limits on
vicarious liability mentioned above.
Another class of §1983 cases finds little parallel in the private
sector. Rules of official immunity sometimes allow public officers
to escape individual liability under §1983. But Owen v. City of
Independence74 provides that municipalities cannot raise official im-
munity as a defense to their own liability. As a result, municipalities
"There is, of course, much more that could be said about the role of economics in
developing legal rules. See, e.g., Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value, 9J. Legal Stud. 191 (1980);
Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. Legal Stud. 227 (1980);
Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. Legal Stud. 243
(1980); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. Legal Stud. 103 (1979).
74445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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may incur liability under § 1983 even if the individual tortfeasor is
immune. Here, too, of course, the municipality's liability is con-
tingent on the plaintiff's ability to satisfy Monel's policy rule.
Our analysis will not question the efficiency of these rules of
immunity where they apply. The doctrine of official immunity
raises a number of difficult legal and economic issues, 75 but we shall
assume that rules of official immunity are immutable and direct our
inquiry to how the rule of vicarious liability should be designed
given the existing rules of immunity. We must digress briefly, there-
fore, to sketch the limits of official immunity.
Certain classes of individual defendants are "absolutely" immune
from damages actions under § 1983. Specifically, absolute immunity
has been conferred upon state legislators when acting in a legislative
capacity,6 upon judges when not acting in the clear absence of
jurisdiction,7 7 and upon prosecutors when acting as advocates in
the criminal process. 7
Otherwise, all public officials can assert a defense of qualified
immunity under §1983. 79 At first, this qualified immunity had
both a subjective and an objective element; an official could be
held liable for committing a constitutional tort if the official "knew
or reasonably should have known that the action he took... would
violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of consti-
tutional rights or other injury.. ."80 Because this formulation,
"See, e.g., Epstein, Private Law Models for Official Immunity, 42 L. & Contemp. Probs.
53 (1978).
76Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); see also Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (absolute immunity for regional legislators
acting under authority of interstate compact).
"Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
7Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). In both Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31, and
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 1295 n.2, the Supreme Court expressly reserved
judgment on whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when he acts as an
administrator or investigator rather than as an advocate.
"Although the Supreme Court has not issued a blanket holding that all state and local
officials are entitled to at least qualified immunity, it has extended such immunity to every
public official who has sought it. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (police
officers); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (executive officials); Procunier v. Navarette,
434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (mental
hospital administrators); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members).
0Id. at 322. Although the Court in Wood limited its holding to school board members,
subsequent cases relied upon Wood as a general statement of the qualified immunity test.
E.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 562-63; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 815, n.25 (1982).
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particularly its subjective element, made it difficult for public
officials to obtain summary judgment, the Court revised the qual-
ified immunity standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.81 Harlow elimi-
nated the subjective element and made the objective element more
favorable to defendants. Government officials now enjoy immunity
from liability for civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known."82 Public officials have a
duty to follow clearly settled law, but are immune from suit if
their actions were of uncertain legality under an objective standard
when they were taken.83 Qualified immunity is also referred to as
"good faith" immunity: acts that satisfy the Harlow test are said
to be acts in "good faith"; acts that do not meet the test are said
to be in "bad faith."
As noted, municipalities cannot claim the same immunity as their
officials under §1983 .4 This is true whether that immunity is ab-
solute or qualified .8 The vast majority of municipal liability cases,
however, involve acts by officers who are entitled only to good faith
immunity. 86
81457 U.S. 800 (1982).
2Id. at 818. See also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
"Cf. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530-35 (1985); Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723,
732-33 (3d Cir. 1987); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1569 (7th Cir. 1985). See generally
Nahmod, note 5 supra, at §8.06.
"Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
8"Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1983); Hernandez v. City
of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1194-1200 (5th Cir. 1981).
"Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. 391 (1979),
local-as opposed to state-legislators were given only qualified immunity. See, e.g., Thomas
v. Younglove, 545 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1976); Lane v. Inman, 509 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975);
Curry v. Gillette, 461 F.2d 1003 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Nelson v.
Knox, 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958). In Lake Country Estates, which dealt with the immunity
of regional legislators acting under an interstate compact, the Court left the issue of local
legislators' immunity open; Justice Marshall noted in dissent that, as a practical matter, the
Court's reasoning resolved the question in favor of absolute immunity. 440 U.S. at 408-09
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Since that decision, a number of courts of appeals have held that
local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity. See, e.g., Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d
96 (3d Cir. 1983); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1983); Hernandez
v. City of Fafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 19981); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir.
1980). See generally Nahmod, note 5 supra, at §7.05. Nonetheless, these cases are relatively
rare. Also rare are cases in which a plaintiff sues a municipality for the act of a municipal
judge or a local prosecutor. The combined number of cases in all three of these categories
does not compare to the number of cases filed against police officers and other municipal
officials who have only good faith immunity.
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V. THE SCOPE OF MUNICIPAL LIABILrIT FOR "BAD FAITH" ACTS
BY MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
Setting aside for the moment any consideration of "good
faith" acts, and assuming that a cause of action against the individual
official for bad faith acts is efficient, 87 we now examine whether
the policy rule of Monell is an economically sensible criterion for
the imposition of vicarious liability on municipalities. We conclude
it is not. The application of common-law agency principles, in-
cluding the doctrine of respondeat superior, would likely produce
improvement. Moreover, we contend that a negligence-based ap-
proach to municipal liability for bad faith acts might do better still.
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHOICE BETWEEN PERSONAL LIABILITY
AND VICARIOUS LIABILITY
It is perhaps tempting to assume that the choice between vicarious
liability (a regime in which employers and employees are jointly
and severally liable) and personal liability (a regime in which only
employees are liable) is always important on the premise that a
judgment against the employee under personal liability will have
little or no impact on the employer. Recent work on the economics
of vicarious liability, however, suggests that the choice between
vicarious liability and personal liability has no economic conse-
quences if two conditions prevail: (1) the employee has sufficient
assets to pay any conceivable judgment against him in full (perhaps
with the aid of insurance or contractual indemnification from the
employer), and (2) the transaction costs of employment contracts
that include terms to allocate liability between the employer and
the employee are small."" The intuition that underlies this propo-
sition is quite simple.8 9
Suppose that a rule of personal liability prevails, so that only the
employee incurs liability for the employee's torts. In negotiating
87The assumption that the cause of action against the individual employee is efficient
implies that economic welfare is greater when the cause of action is allowed that when it is
barred. Without this assumption, potentially difficult second-best issues complicate the
analysis.
88See Sykes, The Economies of Vicarious Liability, note 70 supra, at 1239-43.
89The analysis assumes that there are no systematic errors in the assignment of liability
or the computation of damages under either personal liability or vicarious liability: in either
regime, expected liability is equal to the actual costs suffered by injured parties.
11987
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an employment agreement, the employer and the employee can
nonetheless include provisions that allocate the risk of liability judg-
ments against the employee between the employer and the em-
ployee. Perhaps the employer will agree to assume some or all of
the risk of liability, or perhaps the employee will agree to bear this
risk in exchange for higher wages or other benefits. The precise
terms of this agreement will depend upon each party's attitude
toward risk-bearing, upon the need to create proper incentives for
the employee, upon each party's bargaining power, and so on.
Now suppose that the liability rule is changed to vicarious lia-
bility. The employer and the employee must renegotiate their em-
ployment agreement to take account of the fact that judgments may
now be rendered against the employer. The total amount paid to
the plaintiff by the employer and the employee remains the same,
however, for if employees can pay adverse judgments in full under
personal liability, all judgments will be satisfied under either lia-
bility rule. That being true, the renegotiated employment agree-
ment under vicarious liability can exactly replicate the division of
liability agreed to by the employer and the employee under personal
liability.
Moreover, if the second condition above is met, if the transaction
costs of replicating the division of liability and all other terms and
incentives contained in the employment agreement negotiated un-
der personal liability are small, then the employment agreement
under vicarious liability will tend to replicate the preferred agree-
ment under personal liability.90 At least the change to vicarious
liability is unlikely to have any systematic or predictable effect on
the employment agreement.
Whichever rule prevails, then, injured parties are fully compen-
sated, the incentives facing employees are likely to be the same,
0Of course, the analysis works in reverse if the liability rule changes from vicarious liability
to personal liability, thus establishing the equivalence of the two regimes. Formal models of
bargaining developed by game theorists typically embody an assumption-known as the
"independence of irrelevant alternatives"--that leads directly to this result. See, e.g., Nash,
The Bargaining Problem, 18 Econometrica 155 (1950); Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious
Liability, in Two Essays in the Economics of Law (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation 1987).
One can also show that if employees can pay all judgments in full under personal liability
and the transaction costs of contracting are negligible, then any employment agreement that
is Pareto optimal from the perspective of the employer and the employee under personal
liability is also Pareto optimal from their perspective under vicarious liability. Ibid.; Korn-
hauser, note 70 supra.
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and the ultimate allocation of risk (in contrast to the initial allocation
created by the legal rule) is likely to be the same. It follows that
the efficiency of resource allocation is invariant to the liability rule.
This analysis seems at first to be equally applicable to employ-
ment relationships in the public and private sectors. One need only
assume that the employer and the employee each have preferences
among the alternative employment agreements that jointly deter-
mine, along with each party's bargaining power, the terms of their
agreement. Then, if the mutually preferred employment agreement
under one liability rule can be reconstructed at little cost under the
other rule, the choice between the two rules is unlikely to have any
systematic effect on the terms of the employment relationship or
the resulting allocation of resources.
This conclusion is at odds with recent literature on governmental
liability and immunities. This literature implies that, even if em-
ployees are able to pay judgments against them in full, and even if
the transaction costs of employment agreements are low, a rule of
personal liability will have a perverse effect on the incentives and
productivity of government workers. 91 Employees in the public
sector, the argument runs, perform tasks that benefit the public as
a whole, not just themselves or the organization that employs them.
Personal liability, by contrast, is a cost that is borne entirely by the
employee. Personal liability thus encourages overcautious behavior
or inaction by the employee: while the employee enjoys all the
benefits associated with his reduced exposure to civil liability, the
costs of excessive caution or inaction fall on the public as a whole.
Proponents of this argument conclude, therefore, that personal li-
ability is undesirable, and implicitly assume that the adverse effects
of personal liability will not be eliminated by contract (for example,
by the use of indemnity agreements). They recommend greater
immunity for government employees, coupled with expanded gov-
ernmental liability.
This analysis is flawed. All employers, public or private, face
incentive problems. It is usually too costly for employers to observe
the behavior of each employee at all times, and thus impossible to
91See, e.g., Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and Official
Accountability, 42 L. & Contemp. Probs. 8, 26-28 (1978); Schuck, Suing the Government
(1983); Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public
Officials for Damages, 1980 Supreme Court Review 28 1.
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design an incentive structure that perfectly harmonizes the behavior
of employees with the interests of the employer. The result is the
familiar problem of "agency costs," the costs of shirking, of im-
prudence, of overcaution, of inaction, and so on. To a large extent,
these costs fall on the employer whether the employer is public or
private.
Because employees' incentives are seldom perfectly aligned with
employers' interests, the imposition of personal liability on an em-
ployee may lead to an exercise of caution that is excessive from the
employer's perspective: 92 the employee will perceive benefits from
excessive caution in the form of reduced exposure to liability, while
the costs of excessive caution-decreased productivity-fall, in the
first instance, on the employer. The employer can respond to this
problem by altering the employee's incentive structure to encourage
him or her to perform more desirably. For example, if a truck driver
for Sears is personally liable for his or her motor vehicle torts, Sears
can discourage overcautious driving by rewarding the driver for
timely deliveries or penalizing late deliveries. Similarly, if a po-
liceman for the City of Chicago is personally liable for the unin-
tended use of excessive force, the City can try to discourage timidity
or inaction in the pursuit of suspects by rewarding policemen with
distinguished arrest records or penalizing policemen whose arrest
records suggest ineffectiveness.
Of course, some incentive problems are more difficult than oth-
ers. It may be easy to determine when a delivery is late, but quite
difficult to ascertain when police conduct is timid. Thus, in our
hypotheticals, Sears may find it easier to remedy the incentive
problem than the City of Chicago (though Chicago can always
ameliorate the problem by indemnifying its policemen). But that
observation is irrelevant: the fact remains that it is in the interest
of any employer, public or private, to utilize whatever cost-effective
incentives are available to eliminate the undesirable consequences
of personal liability.
Moreover, as explained above, the ultimate allocation of risk-
and the attendant set of incentives facing employees-will not be
9"This problem may not arise if personal liability attaches only to harms that the employee
intends to cause. Because the employee need only refrain from deliberate misconduct to
avoid liability, he or she has no incentive to become overcautious. Consequently, there may
be no adverse effect on employee productivity. The possibility of frivolous lawsuits predicated
on intentional misconduct, however, might induce overcaution even under these circumstances.
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affected by the choice between personal liability and vicarious li-
ability so long as judgments would be paid in full under either
liability rule and the transaction costs of contracting are low enough
to permit the employment agreement that would prevail under
personal liability to be reconstructed under vicarious liability (or
vice-versa). Under these conditions, the initial locus of liability
simply does not affect the mutually preferred set of contractual
incentives, 93 including the ultimate division of liability between the
employer and the employee.
To be sure, the incentives contained in the employment contract
may not be socially optimal. In the public sector, for example, poor
performance by governmental employees may impose considerable
costs on members of the general public while imperfections in the
political process insulate public agencies from any substantial pres-
sure to eliminate these costs. Consequently, employment agree-
ments in the public sector may work poorly at motivating employees
to serve the public interest. But such problems with the perfor-
mance of public sector employees are not affected by the choice
between personal liability and vicarious liability when employees
are able to pay adverse judgments in full and the transaction costs
of contracting are low-the terms of employments agreement, in-
cluding the existence or non-existence of indemnification agree-
ments and the like, will be the same under either regime. Of course,
these two conditions may not be satisfied, in which case the choice
between personal and vicarious liability can have significant effects
on resource allocation, problems to which we now turn.
B. THE EFFICIENCY OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY WHEN THE EMPLOYEE IS
JUDGMENT-PROOF
Municipal employees are often unable to pay adverse judgments
in full. Judgments in § 1983 cases are frequently quite large; amounts
9The concept of "inc-ntives" here is quite broad. For example, suppose that a vicariously
liable employer decides to establish a training program to instruct employees on precautions
against accidents. The employer finds the program desirable because its cost is less than the
reduction in his expected liability. Would the training program also be desirable under
personal liability? If employees can pay judgments against them in full, the answer is yes.
Employees can finance the program through a reduction in wages, and it is advantageous
for them to do so because the cost is again less than the reduction in their expected liability.
Unless transaction costs prevent the employees from bargaining for the program, then, it
will be established whatever the liability rule.
[1987
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in excess of several hundred thousand dollars are not uncommon. 94
Plainly, such judgments will usually exceed the personal assets of
municipal employees. 95
The fact that municipal employees are often judgment-proof may
have profound effects on resource allocation. It can affect the scale
of municipal activity; the degree of supervision, training, and other
incentives that discourage constitutional torts; the productivity of
municipal employees; and the efficiency of risk allocation. To un-
derstand these effects, and their implications for the choice between
personal and vicarious liability, it is instructive to begin by exam-
ining the inefficiencies that arise when employees are judgment-
proof under a regime of personal liability.
1. The inefficiencies of personal liability, a) The private sector. In the
private sector, the inefficiencies of personal liability for torts when
employees are judgment-proof may be readily identified. Under
such circumstances, a rule of personal liability allows the business
enterprise to "externalize" costs of doing business by passing off
all or part of the losses occasioned by the commission of a tort onto
the victim. 96 One result of cost externalization is that the incentive
to exercise care to avoid the occurrence of torts may be inadequate,
either for the employer or the employee. Alternatively, even though
94Cf. Nahmod, note 5 supra, at §4.03.
91Of course, municipal employees exposed to the risk of large judgments under a rule of
personal liability may seek employment agreements that provide indemnification. Indeed,
some municipal employees are indemnified by their state governments. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub.
Off. Law §18 (McKinney 1984). Municipalities will be reluctant to provide indemnification
for "bad faith" behavior that consists of knowing, intentional torts by the employee; the
attendant moral hazard would likely be unacceptable. E.g., id. at §18(4) (b) (excluding
indemnification for "intentional wrongdoing or recklessness"). But many bad faith acts that
give rise to liability are merely negligent-the failure of a policeman in the heat of the
moment to abide by the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, for example, or the unwitting
failure of supervisors to provide constitutionally required process before discharging a sub-
ordinate. Employees may succeed in obtaining indemnification for liability that arises from
such behavior. By agreeing to indemnify employees, the municipality (or its state government)
in effect imposes vicarious liability on itself by contract. Any judgment will generally be
satisfied in full, and, as suggested above, the choice between personal liability and vicarious
liability likely becomes a matter of indifference. The "policy rule" of Monell has no practical
effect.
9 This discussion assumes that the tort is "caused" by the employment relationship in the
following sense: If the employment relationship dissolves and the employee remains un-
employed, the probability of the tort is reduced to zero. Under this assumption, the tort is
properly viewed as a cost of production for the business enterprise. See Sykes, The Bound-
aries of Vicarious Liability, note 70 supra.
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a judgment-proof employee does not bear the full cost of the injuries
that he causes, the prospect that a judgment could render him
bankrupt may motivate the employee to exercise an inefficiently
high level of care if he is risk averse. If the employer cannot eliminate
this incentive for excessive care except through indemnification-
potentially very costly to the employer-the employer may decide
simply to tolerate the excessive level of care.
In addition, if either employees or prospective injured parties are
risk averse, the allocation of risk under personal liability may be
inefficient. Risk allocation could be improved if the risk of injury
were shifted to a more efficient risk bearer such as an insurance
company or, in many cases, the employer.
Finally, in a competitive market, the added profitability that re-
sults from cost externalization attracts new entry and encourages
the expansion of existing firms until the prevailing price falls to the
level of private marginal costs. Because the externalization of lia-
bility implies that private marginal costs are below social marginal
costs, the resulting scale of business activity is excessive. 97
Despite these inefficiencies, the externalization of liability can
prove worthwhile from the perspective of the employer and the
employee. The resulting increment in expected profits to the busi-
ness enterprise can be divided between the employer and the em-
ployee (in the form of higher wages) to make them both better off
at the expense of the injured party whose judgment goes wholly
or partially unsatisfied. For this reason, rational profit-maximizing
or utility-maximizing employers and employees will often enter
employment agreements that do not provide the employee with
indemnification and that expose the employee to a risk of bankruptcy.
b) The public sector. To a considerable extent, the inefficiencies and
incentives for liability externalization that arise in the private sector
under a rule of personal liability also arise when the employer is a
municipality. But there are important differences as well.
Consider first the incentive to externalize liability. As explained
above, cost externalization is often profit-maximizing for a private
firm. With the possible exception of certain independent, proprie-
tary government entities, however, municipal agencies are not usu-
ally motivated by the desire to maximize profits.
9'But see note 113 infra.
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Yet municipalities (or, more accurately, municipal officials) are
to some extent motivated by a desire to provide public services at
minimum cost. Most elected officials confront demands for both
increased levels of public services and lower taxes. Although the
response to these pressures may be somewhat unpredictable and
imperfect, opportunities for cost reduction are likely to be explored.
The externalization of liability is one such opportunity.
Of course, any costs that are "externalized" will fall to a large
extent on citizens of the municipality-the voters. For a variety of
reasons, however, voters may not act as an effective check on lia-
bility externalization and the inefficiencies that may accompany it
even if they bear the brunt of the externalized costs. Injuries caused
by municipal employees may be relatively low-probability events
about which most voters are poorly informed, and which conse-
quently do not have much influence on voting. Moreover, even
well-informed voters probably view the problem of injuries caused
by municipal employees as unimportant by comparison to other
issues, and thus of little moment in deciding how to vote. By
contrast, the tax assessment is all too familiar to most voters, many
of whomn will reward officials who minimize it.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the costs of uncompen-
sated injuries may fall disproportionately on segments of the pop-
ulation with limited political power. The costs of police misconduct,
for example, may fall primarily on the poor, on minorities, and on
individuals with prior convictions, while the costs of compensating
such injuries through tax revenues will be more broadly dispersed.
The result may well be that a majority of the electorate, even if
well-informed, will prefer liability externalization despite the at-
tendant inefficiencies.
Consequently, even though municipalities will rarely be moti-
vated to externalize liability by the pursuit of "profit," powerful
incentives to take advantage of the opportunity to externalize lia-
bility may nonetheless arise. The fact that liability externalization
occurs in the public sector rather than the private sector warrants
no presumption that it is efficient or otherwise in the overall public
interest.
Given the incentive to externalize liability that may arise on the
part of municipalities, then, will externalization lead to the same
inefficiencies as in the private sector? The answer is yes, and no.
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First, as in the private sector, cost externalization by municipal-
ities and their employees may result in inadequate incentives to
take precautions against wrongdoing. Employees may exercise in-
efficiently little care in performing their duties or, with respect to
intentional harms, the level of deterrence may be inadequate. 98
Similarly, as in the private sector, the externalization of liability
diminishes the incentives of municipalities to institute training,
supervision and monitoring, or otherwise to dissuade wrongdoing
through injury-contingent contractual penalties. On the other hand,
it is conceivable that municipal employees may exercise inefficiently
high levels of care due to the conjunction of risk aversion with
personal liability, or to the fact that the burden of overcautious
behavior falls on the general public and not on the employees. As
noted, municipalities have an incentive to correct this problem, and
the most obvious way to do so would be by indemnifying employ-
ees. But the costs of indemnification may be too high from the
municipality's perspective (it requires forgoing the benefits of cost
externalization), and effective alternatives to indemnification may
not exist.
Although the problem of excessive care surely exists in the ab-
stract, we doubt its significance with respect to "bad faith" consti-
tutional torts. Many of these torts involve intentional harms, and
others involve reckless behavior or other conduct that reflects com-
plete inattention or indifference to constitutional requirements. It
therefore seems unlikely that personal liability for such torts will
often induce overcautious behavior or inaction, as the employee can
avoid liability with minimal effort.- Rather, the problems of un-
"Bad faith constitutional torts may be either intentional or negligent. If a supervisor
discharges a subordinate on the basis of race, for example, or a policeman deliberately
brutalizes a suspect, the tort is plainly intentional. By contrast, if a policeman carelessly
exceeds his authority under a search warrant, or a supervisor unthinkingly discharges an
employee without an adequate hearing, the injury is not intentional but negligent or reckless.
9This is true of the factual issue on which §1983 claims are typically based as well as the
question of immunity under Harlow. The factual component in § 1983 cases invariably con-
cerns intentional action by a state official, such as whether an official searched a plaintiff's
home. The uncertain element in such cases is the legal effect of this intentional action and
the official's knowledge of the law: should the official have known that he lacked probable
cause to search? Until recently, claimed deprivations of due process were an exception to
this rule and could be based on allegations that a government official acted negligently.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). In Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct 662 (1986), however,
the Supreme Court overruled Parratt and held that injuries inflicted by governmental neg-
ligence do not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court reserved the question "whether
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derinvestment in care and underdeterrence are probably far more
serious inefficiencies of personal liability for these torts.
A second consequence of cost externalization that may arise in
the public sector as well as in the private sector is inefficiency in
risk allocation. The costs of injuries fall on the victim and the
individual wrongdoer who, as in the private sector, are often risk
averse. Here too, then, the efficiency of risk bearing can be im-
proved by shifting the risk to a risk neutral (or less risk averse)
entity. Of course, even a risk averse wrongdoer is an efficient "risk"
bearer in cases involving intentional injuries' ° and, as noted,10°
many bad faith constitutional torts involve intentional misconduct.
But if the wrongdoer is unable to pay judgments against him in
full, the risk still falls on the risk averse victim in many cases, and
risk allocation remains inefficient.
With respect to the third possible inefficiency of personal liability
in the private sector, distortion in the scale of activity, the situation
in the public sector is significantly different. As noted above, eco-
nomic theory predicts that cost externalization in a competitive
market will lead (other things being equal) to an inefficiently large
scale of activity as prices fall below social marginal costs of pro-
duction. No such prediction can be made about the effects of cost
externalization on the scale of governmental activity for the simple
reason that economists have no generally accepted theory of how
the scale of public sector activity is determined in the first place.
If the scale of activity is determined by majority vote, for ex-
ample, the preferences of the "median voter" might be decisive.102
Whether the scale of government activity established by the "me-
dian voter" is efficient depends upon a variety of factors that de-
termine how the costs and benefits of government activity are dis-
something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or 'gross negligence,' is enough
to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 667 n.3. As to "good faith"
torts, see notes 122-32 infra and accompanying text.
10°If the employee knows that particular behavior will produce an actionable injury with
certainty, and knows that he can avoid the injury with certainty by refraining from the
behavior in question, then the employee does not bear any "risk" if he incurs personal
liability for such behavior. Such a deterministic relationship between the behavior and the
existence of an actionable wrong is characteristic of most "intentional" misconduct. It follows
that aside from any risk of exposure to baseless litigation, there is no inefficiency in risk
allocation if the wrongdoer bears the full cost of any injury that he "intentionally" causes.
"'1See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
1°'See, e.g., Atkinson & Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economies 299-326 (1980).
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tributed among members of the voting public. If the benefits of
government activity accrue to a minority of citizens but the costs
are widely dispersed, for example, then the scale of activity deter-
mined by majority vote may be inefficiently small. The reverse
possibility also exists.
To complicate matters further, direct majority voting only rarely
determines the scale of government activity. More commonly, the
scale of activity is determined by elected representatives and ap-
pointed bureaucrats who respond to complex and widely divergent
incentives. A variety of theories have been advanced that directly
or indirectly purport to explain the resulting scale of government
activity-theories of budget-maximizing bureaucrats, theories of
voters who "vote with their feet" by relocating to find a preferred
mix of public services, and many others.103 Some of these theories
predict that the scale of government activity will tend to be inef-
ficiently high while some predict the opposite; some yield no de-
terminate prediction about the efficiency of scale. 104
Assuming, therefore, that cost externalization by the public sec-
tor tends to increase the scale of government activity,'10 it is unclear
whether the resulting increment in scale will enhance or worsen
the efficiency of resource allocation. In some cases, cost external-
ization may cause government activity to expand from an already
excessive base; in other cases, the expansion may offset conditions
that would otherwise produce an inefficiently small scale of activity.
Thus, at least two of the inefficiences associated with a rule of
personal liability when employees are judgment proof are found in
the public as well as the private sector: the reduction of incentives
to avoid committing torts and an inefficient allocation of risk. With
respect to the third inefficiency in the private sector-an inefficient
'10 For a partial survey, see Mueller, Public Choice (1979).
'
4The Niskanen model of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat, for example, predicts over-
provision of public services. Mueller, note 103 supra, at 156-63. The theory of public goods
by contrast, implies some tendency for under-provision of public goods due to free-rider
problems. See, e.g., Malinvaud, Lectures on Microeconomic Theory 211-19 (1972).
°
53Whatever the details of the public choice process, it seems likely that an increase in the
cost of government services to the public treasury will usually (though perhaps not alvays)
lead voters or their representatives to economize on those costs through some reduction in
the scale of government activity. Conversely, a reduction in the cost of government services
to the public treasury will tend to produce an expansion in the scale of government activity.
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increase in the scale of activity-no prediction can be made with
respect to the public sector.
2. The consequences of vicarious liability. Under the common law of
torts, the imposition of vicarious liability on employers usually
occurs pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.'0 6 Respondeat
superior is a form of "strict" liability: the plaintiff need not show
that the employer was negligent or otherwise culpable, and, once
the employee's liability is established, the derivative liability of the
employer follows without more.
In some cases, however, the employer cannot be held liable unless
the plaintiff proves that the employer breached a duty to the plain-
tiff, for example, the limited duty of an employer to control the
conduct of an employee acting outside the scope of employment. 107
Derivative liability on the basis of negligent failure to supervise a
wrongdoer or otherwise to prevent a wrong is also quite common
outside the employment relationship. ,08 Strictly speaking, of course,
such liability is not "vicarious" at all, as the derivatively liable party
breached its own duty of care. For convenience of exposition, how-
ever, we refer below to two types of "vicarious" liability: strict
vicarious liability and vicarious liability based on negligence.
More precisely, we understand "strict" vicarious liability to be
the application to municipalities of the same common-law agency
principles that govern the liability of private sector employers. The
doctrine of respondeat superior is the most important of these principles.
A "negligence" approach to the liability of the municipality would,
by contrast, require the plaintiff to prove that municipal employees
with supervisory authority over the wrongdoer failed to adopt some
cost-effective measure to avert the constitutional tort and that the
absence of such a measure proximately caused the injury. For ex-
ample, if the constitutional tort arose in connection with an illegal
police search, the plaintiff might show that the police officers were
inadequately trained or supervised or that the police department
1"6See generally Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, note I supra, at 501-08.
107See Restatement (Second) of Torts §317 (1965).
lcaSee Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability, note 70 supra. For example, the
version of the Sherman Amendment that was finally passed imposes liability on individuals
who know that someone else will commit a constitutional tort and have power to prevent it
but fail to act. See 42 U.S.C. §1986. There are many other examples.
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neglected to establish reasonable internal policies to deter illegal
searches. 109
To some, the negligence approach might seem peculiar-the mu-
nicipality escapes liability for the wrong of one employee, while it
incurs liability for the wrong of a second employee. But upon
reflection, the result is not peculiar at all.
Personal liability on the active wrongdoer operates directly upon
his incentives, but not upon the incentives of supervisors. And,
because of transaction costs (discussed below) or because the active
wrongdoer is judgment proof, personal liability may produce little
or no indirect pressure for cost-effective supervision. To generate
such incentives under these circumstances, the scope of liability
must be expanded.
One option would be to impose personal liability on the negligent
supervisors. We reject that option, principally because it would
involve potentially intolerable litigation costs. Specifically, although
plaintiffs might reasonably be expected to explain how better train-
ing, monitoring, or supervision of the tortfeasor could have pre-
vented their injury, it might be extraordinarily difficult for them
to identify which supervisory officials were responsible-indeed, a
colorable claim of negligence might be advanced against numerous
officials at various stages of the hierarchy. A rule imposing personal
liability on negligent supervisors would thus tempt plaintiffs to
implead any number of municipal officials. Each might well want
his own attorney, and the ensuing litigation over which official was
the "negligent" one would consume considerable resources. Com-
pounding the problem is the fact that supervisors themselves may
be judgment proof, so that the imposition of personal liability upon
negligent supervisors may still fail to create adequate incentives for
supervision.
We therefore conclude that incentives for cost-effective super-
vision within the municipal hierarchy can be created more effi-
ciently by a rule that imposes liability on the municipality rather
than upon negligent supervisors individually. The more difficult
question is whether those incentives should be created through a
rule of strict vicarious liability for bad faith torts, or whether the
victims of bad faith torts should be required to show that the tort
0'Justice O'Connor adopted a variation of this approach in her dissent from the dismissal
of the petition for certiorari in City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 107 S.Ct. 114 (1987).
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also resulted from an act of negligence somewhere within the ad-
ministrative hierarchy.
Either type of vicarious liability can ameliorate certain ineffi-
ciencies that arise under personal liability when municipal em-
ployees are judgment-proof. Take the problem of underinvestment
in care by the employee or the employer or the problem of under-
deterrence of intentional harms. If, as is almost certainly the case,
fiscal pressures produce incentives for municipalities to minimize
the cost of delivering municipal services, strict vicarious liability
will motivate the municipality to adopt cost-effective measures to
reduce the incidence of misconduct." 0 But much the same incen-
tives for taking cost-effective measures to prevent misconduct will
arise if vicarious liability is imposed on the basis of negligence,
assuming that "negligence" is defined in accordance with the Learned
Hand test as the failure to take cost-effective precautions.
Indeed, by singling out negligent supervisory officials and iden-
tifying the measures that they should have taken, a negligence-
based approach to vicarious liability might be more effective than
strict vicarious liability at motivating cost-effective monitoring,
training, and similar measures: negligence cases would generate a
body of information about required precautionary measures for the
guidance of other municipalities.
The negligence approach also has disadvantages. First, it requires
an expenditure of resources to litigate the issue of negligence, al-
though the total number of lawsuits under a negligence regime will
likely be smaller."' Second, and in contrast to strict vicarious lia-
bility, the negligence approach places the court in the position of
second-guessing municipal officials about what measures should be
taken to guard against constitutional torts, a process that may in-
troduce significant error costs. Finally, although both strict vicar-
ious liability and vicarious liability based on negligence will amel-
iorate the inefficient allocation of risk that results under personal
liability, strict vicarious liability appears to do this better. Strict
"'These measures may include greater supervision of employees, better training programs,
improved penalty/reward incentives conditioned on the occurrence/avoidance of misconduct,
and so on. If the transaction costs of such measures are high, however, shifting liability from
the employee to the employer may actually increase the incidence of negligent or intentional
harms. See Section I-C infra.
"'See Landes & Posner, note 7 supra, at 65-66.
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vicarious liability automatically redistributes the risk of loss from
typically inefficient risk-bearers (victims" 2 and municipal employ-
ees) to a typically superior risk bearer that can distribute the risk
broadly among the taxpaying public. Under the negligence ap-
proach, by contrast, losses are redistributed only when the munic-
ipality is shown to have been negligent.
Yet another difference exists between the two approaches: they
are likely to have differing effects on the scale of municipal activity.
In the private sector, a potential advantage of either strict or neg-
ligent vicarious liability is that it increases the degree of cost-
internalization by business enterprises whose judgment-proof em-
ployees cause injuries. Other things being equal, this improves
resource allocation by encouraging businesses to operate at a more
efficient scale. And, because there is less cost-internalization under
a negligence-based approach to vicarious liability than under strict
vicarious liability, the scale of private sector activity that results
from vicarious liability based on negligence would be less efficient
(other things being equal'1) than the scale of activity that results
from strict vicarious liability.
In the public sector, however, it is unclear whether greater cost
internalization by municipal agencies would, other things being
equal, improve or worsen resource allocation. The problem lies in
the issue discussed above: the scale of municipal activity resulting
from political and bureacratic decisions may be too large or too
small. We simply have no way of knowing. Therefore, even if
greater cost internalization would reduce the scale of activity, it is
impossible to know whether such a reduction would be beneficial. 14
"I First-party insurance is not an entirely satisfactory method of risk redistribution, as
the injuries caused by constitutional torts are often uninsurable in the first-party insurance
market. Loss of public employment and loss of liberty and income due to unlawful con-
finement are illustrative of these uninsurable injuries.
"'Of course, other things may not be equal. Greater cost-internalization by injurers under
strict vicarious liability accompanies reduced cost-internalization by victims. But in some
cases, it may be more efficient for victims to reduce the scale of their activities than for
injurers to reduce the scale of their activities. See, e.g., Shavell, Strict Liability vs. Negli-
gence, 9J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980). Yet the observation in the text with respect to the difference
between the public and private sectors remains valid. Whatever the desirability of cost
internalization by victims, the greater cost internalization by injurers under strict vicarious
liability has some benefit in the private sector (perhaps offset by other costs), but may have
no benefits whatsoever in the public sector.
1
141n other words, a "second-best" issue arises with respect to cost-internalization in the
public sector that does not arise in the private sector. Technically, this "second-best" issue
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To summarize: either strict vicarious liability or vicarious liability
based on negligence is an improvement over personal liability with
respect to the efficiency of deterrent and precautionary measures
to reduce the incidence of constitutional torts. Both would also
likely improve the efficiency of risk allocation, but strict vicarious
liability is probably better than a negligence-based approach in this
regard. Finally, the greater degree of cost-internalization produced
by strict vicarious liability has highly ambiguous effects on resource
allocation. It would almost certainly lead to a greater reduction in
the level of municipal services than the negligence-based approach,
but the efficiency of this reduction is questionable. We therefore
reserve judgment on the choice between the two approaches for
the moment, pending an exploration of transaction cost issues.
It seems clear, however, that either approach is superior to per-
sonal liability when employees are judgment-proof and the trans-
action costs of contractual incentives are low (as assumed through-
out this section). The only possible disadvantage of vicarious liability
arises from the possibility that, in some instances, the greater degree
of cost-internalization under vicarious liability could inefficiently
reduce the scale of municipal activity. Yet, it is also possible that
the increased cost-internalization under vicarious liability would
efficiently reduce the scale of municipal activity. Hence, it seems
that the economic case for pockets of personal liability must rest
on transaction costs, if the case can be made at all.
C. THE PROBLEM OF TRANSACTION COSTS
Although vicarious liability may ameliorate some inefficiencies
of personal liability by eliminating cost externalization, it may result
in other inefficiences if certain transaction costs of employment
agreements are significant. One possible inefficiency associated with
vicarious liability, whether strict or negligent, is that the employee's
incentive to avoid the occurrence of the wrong may be diluted, or
at least the costs of motivating the employee to avoid the wrong
will increase.
also complicates the analysis of precautionary behavior and deterrent measures under the
alternative liability regimes. In particular, although either strict vicarious liability or vicarious
liability based on negligence will motivate cost-effective precautions and deterrent measures,
what is "cost-effective" may depend upon the scale of activity, and thus may differ between
the two regimes. We assume throughout the analysis to follow, however, that such differences
do not weigh systematically in favor of one regime or the other.
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Under vicarious liability, successful plaintiffs tend to collect their
judgments from the deep pocket (the municipal defendant) even if
the individual wrongdoer remains jointly and severally liable. But
if employees do not bear the costs of their wrongdoing, their in-
centive to avoid misconduct will decline. The municipality can
avoid this decline only by introducing contractual incentives that
will motivate precautions against accidental harms and deter inten-
tional harms.
Absent transaction costs to negotiating and enforcing such con-
tractual incentives, a municipality could establish adequate alter-
natives to personal liability. For example, the municipality can pre-
serve the incentive to avoid wrongdoing that is created by personal
liability with a clause in the employment agreement requiring the
wrongdoer to indemnify the municipality for the consequences of
the wrongdoer's acts.
But the limited empirical evidence suggests that employers very
rarely pursue indemnity actions against their employees even when
they have a legal or contractual right to indemnity., " To some
extent, the unwillingness of employers to pursue indemnity actions
may reflect implicit risk sharing agreements motivated by the risk
aversion of employees or the existence of alternative incentive de-
vices that are superior to indemnity. In that case, the unwillingness
of employers to seek indemnity would not evidence any inefficiency
of vicarious liability. It is also possible, however, that indemnity
actions are simply not worth the effort, because the costs of bringing
them and pursuing recovery thereafter may exceed the anticipated
recovery from an employee with limited assets. 116 Under these con-
ditions, the reduction in the incentives of employees to avoid wrong-
"'See The Economics of Vicarious Liability, supra note 70, at 1243, and sources cited.
116. If an employee's assets are too meager to justify the pursuit of indemnity by the
employer under vicarious liability, then a prospective plaintiff under personal liability may
also find it unprofitable to bring suit. If so, then the imposition of vicarious liability will
not dilute the employee's incentives to avoid wrongdoing. For a variety of reasons, however,
plaintiffs may find it worthwhile to file suit even if the employer does not. The plaintiff
may have an emotional or dignitary interest in filing an action that the employer lacks.
Alternatively, the employer may decline to pursue indemnity for fear that it will disrupt
otherwise amicable relations with the workforce-an indemnity action that sends an em-
ployee into personal bankruptcy could send a signal to the workforce that the employer has
little interest in the personal welfare of his employees, affecting morale and productivity
adversely.
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doing may not be outweighed by other benefits, and vicarious li-
ability may be inefficient.
Moreover, even if the employer can maintain the same incentive
to avoid wrongdoing that exists under personal liability through
indemnity actions or some other device, vicarious liability requires
the employer to incur the transaction costs11 7 of doing so. Vicarious
liability also adds an additional party to litigation, and may thus
increase litigation costs significantly. Unless these costs are offset
by some other benefit of vicarious liability, such as a reduction in
the number of wrongs committed due to greater monitoring and
supervision by the employer, vicarious liability will ultimately re-
duce economic welfare. More generally, the economic benefits of
vicarious liability (if any) are greater, the smaller the transaction
costs to the employer of creating effective incentives for employees
to avoid wrongdoing.
1. The nature and magnitude of transaction costs. A variety of factors
affect the transaction costs of establishing contractual incentives to
prevent misconduct. One important factor is the observability of
employee performance. It is usually quite inexpensive to deter mis-
conduct that the employer can cheaply observe before a wrong
occurs: the employer simply intervenes to correct misbehavior be-
fore it causes injury. If behavior is unobservable or costly to observe,
by contrast, ex-post rewards or penalties contingent upon the oc-
currence or non-occurrence of a wrong may be the only options
available to establish proper incentives. Such ex-post incentives,
however, may be quite costly. Consider, for example, the possibility
of requiring the employee to indemnify the municipality: because
litigation and other costs of pursuing an employee's assets are often
quite high relative to the value of the assets, indemnity will often
be uneconomical.
The expected duration of the employment relationship is another
factor that affects the transaction costs of establishing incentives to
"'The absolute magnitude of transaction costs is often less important than their relative
magnitude. For example, the absolute costs of negotiating and enforcing a collective bar-
gaining agreement between a municipality and its police force may be considerable, yet the
existence of the agreement and of the attendant opportunity to bargain carefully on a wide
range of issues may enable the municipality and its police officers to agree upon training,
monitoring, and other incentive mechanisms that cheaply and effectively dissuade consti-
tutional violations by the entire police force.
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avoid misconduct. If the employee anticipates a long association
with the employer and cannot easily secure equally attractive al-
ternative employment, the employer can incorporate effective in-
centives against wrongdoing into routine decisions about career
advancement-decisions about promotions, firings, salary in-
creases, and so on. Such decisions must be made anyway, and it
costs very little to condition them in part upon an employee's history
of wrongdoing. If, however, the anticipated duration of employ-
ment is brief, or if equally attractive alternative employment is
easily available, incentives pertaining to career advancement will
likely be ineffective.
A third factor affecting transaction costs is the extent to which
various employees confront the employer with similar or distinct
incentive problems. If a large number of employees perform similar
functions and pose similar risks of malfeasance, a single system of
incentives that applies to all of these employees may dissuade mis-
conduct satisfactorily, and the employer may achieve considerable
"economies of scale" with such a system. If each employee performs
distinct tasks, by contrast, a costly process of customizing the in-
centives for each employee may be necessary.
Finally, the employer's knowledge of the risk of misconduct and
the opportunities to avoid it will affect the magnitude of transaction
costs. If the employee performs a highly skilled function that the
employer understands poorly, it may be quite expensive for the
employer to design and enforce effective incentives against mis-
conduct. If the risk of misconduct involves behavior that is quite
familiar to the employer, the cost of instituting incentives is lessened.
2. Implications for the rule of municipal liability. As noted at the
outset, the factual patterns that give rise to constitutional tort claims
are tremendously diverse. Consequently, it is difficult to generalize
about the transaction costs of incentives to avoid these torts. Two
examples may be instructive.
Example (i): Police activity is perhaps the most frequent target
of constitutional tort actions. Most of this police conduct occurs on
the streets and is difficult for police supervisors to observe before
the tort occurs, a factor that increases the transaction costs of pre-
venting it. On the other hand, most police officers are career em-
ployees who are deeply concerned about prospects for promotion,
and who cannot move easily to equally remunerative alternative
employment. Cheaply administered rewards and penalties built into
[1987
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career advancement decisions, therefore, may be quite effective at
inducing appropriate behavior. In addition, because the risk of mis-
conduct is similar for every police officer, customized incentives are
probably unnecessary. Finally, the nature of police misconduct is
quite well understood by supervisory employees, making it easy to
design training programs and police manuals that establish detailed
guidelines for line officers to follow.
On the whole, therefore, the costs to the municipality of nego-
tiating and enforcing reasonably effective incentives to dissuade
constitutional violations by the police are probably modest. The
use of costly incentive mechanisms such as indemnity suits against
individual police officers is unnecessary, because training programs,
careful supervision, and injury-contingent penalties relating to ca-
reer advancement can probably suffice to prevent most misconduct.
It follows that the imposition of vicarious liability on the mu-
nicipality is unlikely to dilute the incentives of police officers to
avoid constitutional violations. On the contrary, vicarious liability
will likely motivate municipalities to adopt a variety of cost-effective
devices to reduce the incidence of police malfeasance. These devices
may not be adopted in the absence of vicarious liability because
police officers are often judgment-proof which, as explained above,
allows municipalities to externalize the costs of constitutional vio-
lations and thereby dilutes their incentives to economize on the
costs of injuries.
Example (ii): Hiring and firing decisions are also common targets
of constitutional tort litigation. For concreteness, imagine a small
municipality with a city attorney's office; the office has a small staff,
and the city attorney is ordinarily responsible for hiring and firing
members of the staff. The city attorney discharges a female staff
attorney, purportedly because she is incompetent. The discharged
employee claims, however, that she was fired because of her sex.
If-as seems quite likely-senior municipal officials (the mayor,
the city manager, and so on) lack the expertise necessary to eval-
uate the legal skills of staff attorneys in the city attorney's office,
it is difficult to imagine what type of monitoring or other super-
visory measures they might cost-effectively employ to avoid in-
vidious discrimination in the hiring and firing decisions of the
city attorney. Any attempt to interfere in such decisions might
simply undermine the ability of the city attorney to assemble the
best possible staff.
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Of course, vicarious liability will likely motivate the municipality
to do what it can to avoid hiring a sexist city attorney, but such
proclivities on the part of candidates for the position may be un-
detectable during the hiring process. And, while the municipality
can always establish a policy of firing any city attorney who is
successfully sued under § 1983, even that sanction may be relatively
ineffective if the city attorney can earn a comparable income in
private practice.
Under these circumstances, the imposition of vicarious liability
upon the municipality may not do much to ameliorate any problem
of unlawful hirings and firings. Indeed, it may exacerbate the prob-
lem if its only effect is to insulate potential wrongdoers, like the
city attorney in our hypothetical example, from personal liability.
Vicarious liability may then be counterproductive.
These examples illustrate how transaction costs vary from job
category to job category. And, depending upon the transaction costs
of available contractual incentives, the imposition of vicarious lia-
bility may lead to an amelioration of serious inefficiencies that arise
under personal liability or may actually worsen those inefficiencies.
We now return to an issue raised in the last section, whether a
negligence-based approach to the imposition of vicarious liability
upon municipalities is more or less efficient than strict vicarious
liability. What follows suggests that the possible existence of sig-
nificant transaction costs tends to support adoption of the negligence
approach.
The transaction costs of contractual incentives are directly rel-
evant to a negligence analysis. Under a negligence standard, the
question is whether supervisory employees could have employed
cost-effective measures to prevent the constitutional tort. Where
the transaction costs of contractual incentives are high, cost-effective
measures to prevent the tort may not exist, and thus negligence is
less likely to be found. Where transaction costs are low, cost-effective
measures to prevent the tort may well exist, and a finding of neg-
ligence is more likely. In short, the negligence approach tends to
result in the imposition of vicarious liability in precisely those sit-
uations where transaction costs are lowest and the economic benefits
of vicarious liability are greatest.
Strict vicarious liability, on the other hand, imposes vicarious
liability whenever it is determined that the employee who com-
mitted the wrong was a servant of the municipality acting within
MUNICIPALITIES AND §1983 293
the scope of his employment, a condition that is almost always
satisfied in constitutional torts cases. Thus, a danger exists that
strict vicarious liability may at times reduce the incentives of mu-
nicipal employees to avoid misconduct, or at least increase the costs
of dissuading misconduct, with little or no offsetting benefits. "
For this reason, the negligence-based approach is perhaps the
better alternative, although the choice is a close one. The negligence
approach creates incentives for municipalities to adopt cost-effective
measures to prevent constitutional torts, while preserving the in-
centives created by personal liability for individual employees to
avoid misconduct when municipalities cannot substitute alternative
incentives at reasonable cost or when municipalities have exhausted
all reasonable measures to prevent misconduct.
One last issue requires attention. If vicarious liability is limited
as under the negligence-based approach, there will be more cases
in which the employee is held personally liable and must pay dam-
ages out of his own pocket. This observation brings the analysis
full circle to an issue addressed earlier: whether personal liability
inefficiently reduces the productivity of municipal employees by
causing overcautious, self-protective behavior. If the transaction
costs of contractual incentives to avoid misconduct are high-con-
trary to the assumption embodied in our prior discussion of this
issue-the same may be true of the transaction costs of contractual
incentives to discourage undue timidity or inaction by municipal
employees. One must therefore inquire whether a rule of personal
liability might create inefficiencies that cannot be averted by contract.
11Of course, strict vicarious liability is not necessarily inconsistent with an approach to
vicarious liability that is sensitive to the transaction costs problem. The common-law of
agency and torts creates categories of employment relationships, and imposes vicarious
liability or not depending upon the category into which the employment relationship falls-
respondeat superior applies to the master-servant category. One of the authors has argued
elsewhere that this approach often (though by no means always) leads to vicarious liability
when transaction costs of contracting are low and vicarious liability is relatively more effi-
cient. See Sykes, The Economies of Vicarious Liability, note 70 supra, at 1259-79. In effect,
then, an implicit (though more sweeping and categorical) negligence analysis appears to
underlie the common-law categories.
As noted in the text, however, almost all constitutional torts are committed by servants
under the common-law definition. The city attorney in our illustration, for example, almost
certainly fits the definition of a servant, yet we are uneasy about vicarious liability under
the hypothesized circumstances. We are therefore hesitant to embrace the common-law
categories as an adequate solution to the problem of transaction costs.
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As noted above, bad faith constitutional torts usually involve
intentional harms or reckless behavior that reflect indifference to
well-settled constitutional requirements. Most of these torts are
easily avoidable, and few municipal employees need fear that they
will accidentally commit them."9 The likelihood of overcautious
behavior under personal liability seems small, therefore, even when
the transaction costs of contractual incentives against it are high.
In addition, the costs of any overcautious behavior under personal
liability must be weighed against the costs of shifting liability to
the municipality in circumstances where the municipality cannot
cost-effectively create equivalent contractual incentives against mis-
conduct. Especially where the danger of inducing overcautious be-
havior under personal liability is quite low, as is seemingly the case
for bad faith constitutional torts, the balance would seem to favor
personal liability.
In short, although a negligence-based approach to vicarious lia-
bility would assuredly insulate the municipality from liability in
some cases, it does so in precisely those cases where vicarious lia-
bility is least likely to be beneficial, and where personal liability
produces valuable incentives that may be lost or that will be costly
to replicate under vicarious liability. Strict vicarious liability, as
well as some of the alternatives proposed by other writers, 20 lacks
this important quality.
D. THE POLICY RULE
Is the policy rule of Monell an economically sound basis for the
imposition of vicarious liability upon the municipality? The above
analysis suggests that the answer is no.
In Part I, we noted that the policy rule is somewhat unsettled
and that recent Supreme Court decisions vacillate between two
interpretations of "policy." One interpretation focuses upon the
position of the wrongdoer in the municipal hierarchy; the tort was
committed pursuant to "policy" only if the decision that led to the
"
9To the extent that overcautious behavior might be induced by a fear of baseless litigation,
municipalities can avoid the problem by agreeing to assume the litigation costs of employees
sued for constitutional violations, or at least the costs of employees who successfully defend
themselves.
'
20See note 91 supra.
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tort was made by a high-ranking municipal official in a policymaking
position. The second interpretation focuses on the nature of the
decision that led to the tort; the tort was committed pursuant to
"policy" only if that decision amounted to or resulted from a rule
of general applicability, formulated through a deliberative process.
Neither of these understandings of the policy rule is economically
satisfactory.
The view that requires the decisionmaker to be a policymaker
with final authority in the municipal hierarchy obviously excludes
the possibility of municipal liability for most torts caused by low-
level employees. It does so even when training, monitoring, or
injury-contingent contractual penalties provide a cost-effective means
to avoid the tort or to reduce the incidence of such torts, and despite
the fact that the municipality may lack the incentive to utilize these
measures under personal liability. There is no apparent economic
justification for this limitation.
Concomitantly, municipal liability for constitutional torts caused
by high-level municipal officials may sometimes do little to reduce
the incidence of these torts (or may even increase their incidence)
because of the potentially high transaction costs associated with
establishing contractual incentives to dissuade misconduct. The
higher the official in the municipal hierarchy, the more likely that
the official occupies a specialized and relatively autonomous posi-
tion. As a consequence, other municipal officials will often lack the
expertise to monitor or supervise the official effectively. In addition,
because the duties of officials high in the municipal hierarchy are
often unique, a costly process of negotiating customized contractual
incentives applicable to only the one official will often be necessary.
Consequently, the transaction costs of contractual incentives
against misconduct are probably, on average, relatively great for
high-level municipal officials in policymaking positions. A rule of
municipal liability that limits liability to torts caused by these of-
ficials may at times produce outcomes opposite to those that would
result under the negligence-based approach that we advocate above.
The alternative interpretation of the policy rule, which empha-
sizes the nature of the decision that causes the constitutional tort,
is no better. It is true that municipal liability for the consequences
of rules of general applicability will perhaps motivate more careful
deliberation over the formulation of these rules, and thus reduce
the number of constitutional torts that result from them. But no
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economic basis exists for limiting municipal liability so narrowly.
To the extent that the incidence of constitutional torts can be re-
duced cost-effectively through training, monitoring, and injury-
contingent contractual incentives, it should not matter whether the
torts result from some generally applied rule.
In sum, the policy rule of Monell, in both of its present variations,
is economically unsound as a rule of vicarious liability for bad faith
constitutional torts. As noted, a number of commentators have
suggested abandoning the policy rule in favor of respondeat superior. 121
Our analysis shows that such an approach would certainly be pref-
erable to existing law. But a rule of "vicarious" liability based on
the negligent failure of the municipality to take measures to prevent
the tort is also economically superior to existing law, and is at least
arguably superior to respondeat superior as well.
VI. THE SCOPE OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR "GOOD FAITH"
ACTS BY MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
Good faith torts arise from actions of municipal employees
that are determined to be unconstitutional ex post but were not
clearly unconstitutional ex ante. In many of these cases, municipal
employees or their supervisors undoubtedly recognize that the be-
havior in question falls within a gray area of the law. 22 In other
cases, however, the courts make new law or reverse old law and
apply the change retroactively, with the result that behavior may
ultimately be found unconstitutional even if it appeared certainly
constitutional beforehand. ,23
As noted earlier, municipal employees enjoy individual immunity
for good faith constitutional torts. But under Monell and Owen,
municipalities incur liability for good faith torts committed pur-
suant to official policy. 24 Thus, in this class of cases, the policy
rule of Monell does not simply determine whether a municipality
is vicariously liable for a constitutional tort, it determines whether
the tort is actionable at all.
"'See authorities cited in note 47 supra.
"'See e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Evers v. Custer County, 745 F. 2d
1196 (9th Cir. 1984); Walters v. City of Ocean Springs, 626 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1980).
"'See, e.g., Pembaur, 475 U.S. 469; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622.
1"4See notes 74, 84-86 supra and accompanying text.
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A. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR INDIVIDUAL IMMUNITY
The policy rationale for individual immunity is the familiar con-
cern about self-protective behavior. Without immunity, the courts
suggest, a fear of personal liability would cause municipal employ-
ees to become overcautious in the performance of their duties. 25
This concern is legitimate where, for whatever reason, the mu-
nicipal employer cannot be sued: If the law is unsettled, municipal
employees cannot determine with confidence ex ante which of their
actions may later be judged unconstitutional. To subject them to
personal liability under these conditions may well encourage them
to avoid taking actions that they believe create'an appreciable risk
of liability, with adverse effects on job performance and on overall
social welfare.
Of course, as explained above, the municipality might eliminate
this problem through indemnification agreements or other contrac-
tual incentives that motivate better job performance.1 26 But the
municipality may view indemnification as undesirable because it
eliminates the cost externalization that accompanies the use of
judgment-proof employees. And other incentives for improved job
performance may operate quite imperfectly, especially if the quality
of job performance is difficult or costly to observe. As a result, it
is possible that municipalities will simply tolerate the adverse effects
of personal liability on job performance. If so, personal liability
could lead to serious inefficiencies.
By discouraging behavior of uncertain legality, of course, personal
liability can also reduce the incidence of good faith constitutional
torts. The benefits of this reduction in the number of torts, however,
may well be outweighed by the inefficiencies of uncorrected self-
protective behavior. It may then be economically desirable to pro-
vide individual immunity-at least so long as the employer is not
amenable to suit.
'See e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 424-29; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at
319-21; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 242-49. In addition to this policy rationale, the
Supreme Court has sometimes justified the official immunity doctrine on the ground that
the Forty-Second Congress would have explicitly abolished common-law tort immunities
had it intended to do so. See e.g., Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 376; Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. at 554-55. (1967). As we suggested in Part II, however, this is art incorrect way
to interpret § 1983.
"
6See notes 96-99 supra and accompanying text.
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If the municipal employer can be sued, however, the case for
individual immunity is considerably weakened, whether or not the
transaction costs of contractual incentives are significant. Consider
first the case of low transaction costs. As the analysis in Section V
indicates, the choice between vicarious liability and personal lia-
bility has no economic importance if employees can pay judgments
against them in full and the transaction costs of contractual incen-
tives are low. Precisely the same analysis establishes that the choice
between municipal liability with individual immunity and munic-
ipal liability without individual immunity has no significance if
municipalities can pay judgments against them in full and the trans-
action costs of contractual incentives are low. Because most mu-
nicipalities generally can pay adverse judgments, therefore, our
prior analysis establishes that the rule of individual immunity will
have no effect on resource allocation when transaction costs are low.
When transaction costs are high, individual immunity is still
largely superfluous. For whether the employee enjoys individual
immunity or not, successful plaintiffs will usually collect from the
deep-pocket defendant (the municipality) rather than the employee.
Hence, even if the problem of self-protective behavior makes it
inefficient to place personal liability on the employee, a costly real-
location of liability to the municipality by contract is usually un-
necessary. Alternatively, if it is efficient for the employee to bear
some amount of liability, a costly employment agreement to ac-
complish that result will be necessary regardless of whether the
employee enjoys personal immunity.
It follows that a rule of individual immunity has no impact if the
municipality is amenable to suit. It does no harm, but neither is it
essential to prevent self-protective behavior. If individual immunity
serves some valuable purpose, therefore, that purpose must relate
to cases in which the municipal employer is also immune. This
conclusion contrasts starkly with the conclusions of other writers, 2 7
who argue that individual immunity is an important component of
the liability regime, even when the municipality is subject to suit.
B. THE CASE FOR MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
The remainder of our analysis will assume, as do the courts, that
a serious problem of self-protective behavior would arise if personal
u'
2 See authorities cited in note 91 supra.
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liability were imposed in cases involving good faith torts and that
a rule of individual immunity is therefore efficient for such cases
if the municipality is also immune from suit. We have established
as well that if the municipality can be sued, the existence or non-
existence of individual immunity is largely a matter of indifference.
The analysis is thereby considerably simplified, and only one ques-
tion remains: should there be a cause of action against municipalities
for good faith constitutional torts?
A review of cases involving good faith torts suggests that many
of them involve actions which, ex ante, appear almost certainly to
be legal. Cases in which changes in the law are applied retroactively
are illustrative. 12 Obviously, the imposition of municipal liability
for these actions will have little impact on the ex ante behavior of
municipal employees and their supervisors. It will simply impose
costs ex post that tend to reduce the scale of municipal activity,
with highly ambiguous implications for economic welfare, while at
the same time creating significant litigation costs.
To be sure, liability also redistributes the risk of associated in-
juries, and may therefore provide some risk-sharing benefits if mu-
nicipalities are better risk bearers than injured parties. But risk
sharing benefits alone rarely suffice to justify the imposition of civil
liability, since civil litigation is ordinarily far more costly than al-
ternative mechanisms for the redistribution of risk, such as social
insurance schemes.
Other good faith constitutional tort cases involve actions that are
known ex ante to fall within gray areas of the law.129 If liability
attaches in such cases, municipal employees and their supervisors
may well perceive a substantial possibility of an adverse judgment
in the event of litigation. This prospect, in turn, will induce some
efforts to avoid actions of questionable legality altogether and to
accomplish tasks by alternative means. The question is whether
these efforts are efficient.
That question is quite difficult to answer. The prospect of liability
will discourage actions that would ultimately prove constitutional
as well as actions that would ultimately prove unconstitutional. In
other words, a problem of self-protective behavior arises yet again
as municipalities strive to avoid liability, with potentially adverse
effects on the quality of municipal services. It is impossible to know
"
8See note 123 supra.
12See note 122 supra.
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whether the inefficiencies of self-protective behavior by munici-
palities will exceed the efficiencies associated with a reduced num-
ber of constitutional torts. But the danger of self-protective behavior
certainly weakens the case for the imposition of liability, and the
distinct possibility arises that municipal liability for these good faith
torts is also inefficient. 30
This conclusion again contrasts markedly with the analysis of
other writers,"' who suggest that self-protective behavior is a prob-
lem that arises mainly under personal liability, and that it can be
eliminated by expanded governmental liability coupled with im-
munity for individual officials. On the contrary, inefficient self-
protective behavior is by no means unique to a regime of personal
liability, and its emergence under vicarious liability may justify
governmental immunity just as its emergence under personal lia-
bility may justify individual immunity.
In the end, because the efficiency of municipal liability for good
faith constitutional torts is very much in doubt, a rule of municipal
immunity for such torts is perhaps as attractive as any alternative.
At a minimum, immunity would avoid some costly litigation, elim-
inate some inefficient self-protective measures, and protect munic-
ipalities in some cases against liability that cannot be anticipated at
all ex ante and that consequently would impose considerable bur-
dens on the municipal treasury ex post with no attendant reduction
in the number of constitutional violations. 132
VII. CONCLUSION
The rules presently governing the imposition of municipal
liability in constitutional tort cases are hopelessly flawed. Contrary
"
51This analysis provides no support, however, for the policy rule of Monel, inasmuch as
the risk of self-protective behavior is no smaller for "policy" decisions by high-level officials
than for other decisions by municipal employees.
"'See note 91 supra.
'A possible objection to immunity for good faith constitutional torts is that it would
destroy the incentive for litigation over actions that fall within gray areas of the law, and
thus perpetuate legal uncertainty. Municipal liability would create an incentive to litigate
such actions and thereby promote the resolution of uncertainties. But the resolution of
uncertainty is not in itself advantageous, as the costs of associated litigation may be great.
Besides, the incentive to litigate is considerable even in the absence of municipal liability
for good faith torts. Little would be lost, arguably, if "good faith" constitutional torts were
no longer actionable.
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to the analysis in Monell, there is no evidence in the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 or its legislative history that the Forty-Second Congress
intended to limit vicarious liability for the torts of municipal em-
ployees to actions that are taken pursuant to "policy." Instead, the
historical evidence suggests that Congress intended to leave the
standards for the imposition of vicarious liability to the federal
common law.
More importantly, the "policy rule" of Monell serves no intelligible
purpose. It is largely incompatible with the policy objectives that
the Supreme Court itself invokes on occasion as the basis for the
enactment of § 1983, such as the effective deterrence of wrongdoing.
Thus, the Court, through its common-lawmaking authority,
should adopt an alternative approach to municipal liability. We have
developed an economic analysis that provides some support for the
proposal by other writers that the policy rule be abandoned in favor
of common-law agency principles, including the doctrine of respon-
deat superior, but our analysis suggests still other alternatives. With
respect to the most egregious constitutional torts, those committed
in "bad faith," a negligence approach to municipal liability is ar-
guably as good or better from an economic standpoint than respondeat
superior. And with respect to more innocent "good faith" torts, for
which municipal officials enjoy individual immunity, the extension
of immunity to the municipality is perhaps the best option.
